Posts Tagged 'Norway'

Deep Thoughts by Trond Grande

Ashby Monk

Who is Trond Grande, you ask? Well, he is perhaps the most knowledgeable individual in the world when it comes to the internal operations and strategies of Norway’s $550 billion sovereign fund. He is currently the Deputy CEO and Chief of Staff of Norges Bank Investment Management. And, previously, he was the fund’s Chief Risk Officer and Deputy COO. So if you want to learn something about the NBIM, this is the guy you need to talk to. And, lucky for us, Rupert Wright of The National did just that. So, without further ado, here are some ‘deep thoughts’ by Trond Grande:

On the rise of the Norwegian SWF: “You could say it all began for Norway when Phillips Petroleum found oil on Christmas Eve 1969; they had been drilling without success since the mid-1960s. The [border] line was drawn and much of the oil ended up on the Norwegian side. Throughout 1970s and 1980s most of the revenue was reinvested in the oil business. By the mid-1980s we realised the revenues might outweigh the investments and we might have net positive cash flow from these activities and it might even be so substantial we should try to set something aside, the idea being that these are fields that have been there for millions and millions of years and even though we are the generation that struck oil we shouldn’t be the only ones to benefit. This idea for future generations came up, but also to save the economy from the classic “Dutch disease” of overheating. In 1991 the government passed a law to create a pension fund and in 1996 the first money came into the fund, 2bn a Norwegian krone (Dh1.36bn).

On the shifting investment strategies: ”The question was: where do you put this money? There wasn’t an investment strategy; they just put it in foreign government bonds and that expertise was in the central bank, which partly explains why we are here. Decision was taken to invest outside Norway and Norwegian currencies. In 1998 decision was taken to go into equities. A gradual expansion took place in small and medium-size companies, emerging markets, corporate bonds etc…We lean on the same classification as the FTSE. Not in frontier or African markets, but in developed and emerging markets, 47 different countries…In 2004 we moved to being a responsible investor – our goals are purely financial long term, but we take our investments on the premise that companies that are responsive to certain issues such as climate change and water management, we single them out as focus areas. When we invest we have a series of principles…By 2007 a decision was taken to increase equities from 40 to 60 per cent. As markets were falling, we were buying. About two thirds of equities we hold were bought during the crisis…[W]e are now allowed to invest 5 per cent in real estate. We now have 60 per cent in equities, 35 per cent in bonds and 5 per cent in real estate. It’s our first venture into non-listed or private investment space. Everything else is public in well-regulated markets and exchange traded. We follow benchmarks decided by the finance ministry.

On the benefit from transparency: ”Benefit creates legitimacy of the fund for the Norwegian people. It’s a one-way street, once you say what you’re doing, it’s hard to backtrack. Are we too transparent? I don’t think so but we are getting close. We are balancing that.”

On the Financial Crisis: ”2007 was a zero year. 2008 fund returned minus 23.4 per cent. That was a big loss. This caused a lot of debate. We were selling bonds to buy more equities, because that was part of our new strategy…I wouldn’t say it was calm. There was a lot of debate, culminated in March ’09, that was the bottom. March 11 annual report was released, lots of debate. There was a lot of criticism and suggestion that we sell equities and at least stop buying more. Having been through that stress test we are much stronger now. Because we are a long-term investor we can withstand short-term fluctuations. It could have been the end of the world, all the companies could have gone bust, but it wasn’t likely that would happen.”

Quite a fascinating interview. Kudos to The National (and NBIM) for making it happen.

Norway’s SWF About To Get Aggressive?

Ashby Monk

I’ve given Norway’s SWF a bit of a hard time over the past few years for not taking more advantage of its long-term time horizon. My view is that the largest SWF in world (which claims to have an “infinite” time horizon) should be able to make very solid returns in the world of illiquid assets. However, to date, the fund has been (overly) conservative, preferring traditional asset mixes and ignoring illiquid assets, such as private equity and infrastructure.

Well hold onto your hat, people; that’s all about to change!

Bloomberg is reporting that former central bank governor Svein Gjedrem will replace Tore Eriksen as chief advisor to the MoF on the oil fund’s investment rules. Why is that a big deal, you ask? Because Eriksen was hyper conservative about investment policy. He was, a least to a certain extent, the man behind the fund’s conservative investment approach. Here’s a recent quote from Eriksen:

“…with a big fund there are a lot of management challenges and the more complicated we make the fund the more complicated the management will be…It’s much more complicated to invest in properties, in infrastructure than in equity and bonds, which you can buy every day on every market.”

Ugh. OK. Yes, Mr. Eriksen, what you say is technically true; investing in infrastructure is more complicated than buying a stock on the exchange. Buuuuut, with over $570 billion in assets under management, I’m pretty sure you could find the resources to deal with these new complexities. Think of it as an investment in the organization that will pay dividends in the long run. Parking half a trillion dollars in short-term, volatile, liquid securities is not always preferable to investing in real assets. Trust me.

Anyway, Gjedrem is a totally different type of player. In fact, while he was running Norges Bank, he was pushing Eriksen to let NBIM expand into more illiquid assets. So now that Gjedrem has Eriksen’s job, things are most assuredly going to change. How can I be so sure? Read this blurb taken from a letter Gjedrem wrote to the MoF while at the central bank:

“We [have] recommended that the fund’s investment universe should be expanded to include less liquid investments in private equity and infrastructure, as well as real estate…Investments in real estate and infrastructure confer direct ownership of real assets and an expected return in the form of stable, inflation-adjusted cash flows. This inflation adjustment comes from the periodic income from these investments often being linked to movements in inflation. An increase in this type of real asset in the portfolio should be aimed at, because this can help reduce uncertainty about developments in the fund’s international purchasing power…The fund is well-suited to bearing the risk and harvesting potential gains from investments in less liquid assets, as the fund does not have short-term liquidity needs. Nor is the fund subject to rules that could require adjustments to the portfolio at inopportune times…Investments in traditional infrastructure projects would, in portfolio terms, be expected to contribute stable, inflation-adjusted cash flows and so help safeguard the fund’s long-term international purchasing power. Any investments in infrastructure would consequently be part of the asset class of other real assets.”

That’s music to my ears. Here’s hoping Norway’s fund gets a bit more aggressive in the coming years.

Weekend Reading

Ashby Monk

Jeffrey Frankel has a new paper entitled “A Solution to Fiscal Procyclicality: The Structural Budget Institutions Pioneered by Chile.” It’s quite an informative read that explains the benefits of stabilization funds in helping resource rich countries implement counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Why is this important? Here’s Frankel:

“The tendency to under-save mineral wealth is particularly pronounced during booms.   The temptation to spend the windfall from high world prices is sometimes irresistible.  When the price of the mineral eventually goes back down, countries are often left with high debt, a swollen government sector and non-tradable sector, and hollowed out non-mineral tradable goods sector. They may then be forced to cut back on government spending, completing the perverse cycle of countercyclical saving.”

And this brings us to Chile, which has become the case study of how to achieve counter-cyclicality:

“Chile has over the last decade achieved what few commodity-producing developing countries had previously achieved:  a truly countercyclical fiscal policy…It has beaten the curse of procyclicality via the innovation of a set of fiscal institutions that are designed to work even in a world where politicians and voters are fallible human beings rather than angels. The proposition that institutions make a big difference, that one is less likely to get good policies in the absence of good institutions, has popped up everywhere in economics in recent years…Even though specifics differ from country to country, there is no reason why a version of Chile’s institutions cannot be emulated by other commodity-producing developing countries. Even advanced countries and non-commodity-producers, for that matter, could take a page from the Chilean book.”

Chile’s success with its stabilization fund has undoubtedly come to the attention of policymakers around the world (otherwise Frankel wouldn’t be down in Santiago doing this research). Even Ben Bernanke recently lectured state governors on the benefits of a ‘rainy day fund’.

I predict that, like Norway, Chile will soon have a steady stream of government officials from around the world coming to learn how to set up a successful stabilization fund…

WikiLeaks on SWFs

Ashby Monk

Since WikiLeaks began publicly releasing US embassy cables, I’ve been watching out (typically via the Guardian and Aftenposten) for any that reference SWFs. And, while there have been a few (e.g. here and here), SWFs have played a very minor role and have only been referenced in passing. It would seem that US diplomats had overlooked the SWF phenomenon, which, by the way, had captivated much of the foreign policy world in 2007-2008.

Then, last week, I came across this “sensitive but unclassified” cable (REF: STATE 153075) from November of 2007, which is entitled “Norway and Sovereign Wealth Funds.” The cable offers a recap of a meeting between US embassy staff and Martin Skancke (the cable says “Martin Shanke”, but we can assume that’s just a spelling mistake).

It’s worth a look, as the cable offers some insights into the closed-door discussions that were taking place in 2007 about SWFs. In addition, it offers an insider’s take (Skancke’s) on the GPF-G’s operations. Here is a summary lifted from cable:

“In a November 5 briefing to the diplomatic corps, the Ministry of Finance DG reviewed Norways approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds and the status of Norways approximately $350 million Global Fund (formerly known as the Pension Fund). He said that Norways application of the Ethical Guidelines, which has heavily impacted US companies, is not ideal and an upcoming evaluation may help improve them. The DG also explained that Norway is considering possible divestments from companies building pipelines in Burma. Finally, he noted the possibility of positive investments in companies promoting the public good.”

As this suggests, the US diplomats were keenly interested in the GPF-G’s ethical guidelines and negative screens. Why? Well, perhaps it is due to the fact that 12 of the 21 companies (at the time) that the Norwegian SWF had “negatively screened” out of their portfolio (i.e. divested from) were American.

“Moving to the Ethical Guidelines which have been a source of controversy, Shanke said that the Fund has a negative screening process as well as an ad hoc review process. The negative screening is designed to weed out companies who handle “weapons that through their normal use may violate fundamental humanitarian principles” which he identified as weapons such a cluster munitions or nuclear weapons. (Note: it is as a result of this screening that Norway divested from several American arms manufacturing companies.)”

The cable then goes into detail on the screening process and how the American companies ended up on the notorious exclusion list. And then the cable recounts an interesting exchange between an embassy official and Skancke:

“In response to a question from Emboff which suggested that companies that operate transparently and in open economies may be discriminated against, Shanke agreed that that could happen and that the process is second-best. In the 1990s, his Ministry had argued against an ethical screen because of this problem. Today, with more information available, he thought the system was good enough. He pointed out that an evaluation of the whole process in 2008 may lead to fine-tuning. He welcomed engagement with others on this issue. Finally, he noted that more transparent companies are often easier to engage and so it is more likely that the Central Bank would evaluate them as amenable to negotiations-something which might offset the initial discrimination.

In other words, Skancke ends by suggesting, ‘If we divested from your companies, it’s probably because we had a pretty good reason.’ Fascinating stuff. Now, where’s that US embassy cable from Beijing on the CIC?

Investment Strategies for Long-Term Giants

Ashby Monk

I’ve talked ad nauseam about the inherent qualities of SWFs that (in theory) give them a competitive advantage over private sector fund managers (such as time horizon and scale). But I’d like to raise the issue once again, as I finally got around to reading the entire Dimson Report on investment strategy for Norway’s Government Pension Fund-Global.

As was the case with the earlier Ang, Goetzmann and Schaefer paper for the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, the Dimson, Ilmanen, Liljeblom and Stephansen paper (which is the first deliverable of the fund’s new Strategy Council) is darn good. Here’s a blurb that sets up the paper’s premise:

“The Norwegian Government aims for the Government Pension Fund Global (hereafter the GPFG or the Fund) to be the world’s best managed fund. The objective of the Strategy Council is to offer independent and critical views on the strategy of the Fund and give advice on how to develop the investment strategy further.”

In other words, the paper offers a theoretical take on how a long-term giant like the GPFG should structure its investment strategy to meet its objectives. Moreover, it serves as a primer on risk factors and factor based allocation strategies, which are all the rage among finance wonks at the moment. For me, though, the following excerpt about the unique return opportunities available to SWFs was the most compelling:

“First, the underlying investors – the Norwegian Government on behalf of its citizens – have a long investment horizon. This implies little need for liquidity within the Fund. This gives the GPFG a natural relative advantage for harvesting liquidity premia.

Second, this long horizon makes the Fund more tolerant of return volatility and short-term capital losses than most other investors. Consequently, it should lean towards earning higher risk premia, notably through equity investments.

Third, GPFG has to be cognisant of its large size…In GPFG’s case, its large capital size makes it less practical to use leverage or to exploit illiquid niche markets in a way that has a meaningful impact on the bottom line.

Fourth, as another consequence of its large size, indices that are not based on market capitalisations may be less appropriate for the Fund than for a smaller entity that does not have capacity issues. The large size pushes GPFG toward market-capitalisation weights, for bonds and equities and even, as we note below, currency exposure. The regional weights in the benchmark indices should therefore be reviewed.

Fifth, the Fund can be an opportunistic seller of liquidity. The Fund can be favoured by illiquidity when many investors wish to take the other side of GPFG’s trades. As a large long-horizon investor, the Fund may most effectively earn liquidity and other premia by serving as an opportunistic liquidity provider through contrarian transactions in liquid markets, and through buying unpopular asset classes.

Sixth, as long as oil remains a significant underground resource, the GPFG arguably has less need for inflation hedging than most investors. A deflation scenario is a more damaging tail risk for Norway than an inflation scenario. Nominal government bonds are the best deflation hedges and conversely the assets most subject to inflation risk. It may be reasonable to maintain some amount of government bonds at this stage, despite their low expected returns. Eventually, however, as oil wealth depletes and inflation risks become as important as deflation risks, these bonds could be replaced by assets that provide superior protection against inflation.

Finally, among strategy styles, a value tilt seems more natural for a long-horizon investor than for one with an average time horizon. Value stocks are ones that have typically experienced price declines and waning investor interest. Given the patient, liquidity-supplying and inherently market-stabilizing nature of value strategies, they potentially fit with the long-term objectives of the Fund. Many stocks change their value attributes relatively slowly and (in contrast  to, say, momentum trading) the portfolio turnover implicit in a value strategy need not be unacceptably large.”

And what does this imply for the fund in terms of concrete recommendations?

“There are a number of modifications to the investment strategy that could be contemplated given the above distinctive features of GPFG and expected risk premia:

  • Accept higher risk (from various sources)
  • Expand exposure to illiquid assets
  • Extend rebalancing to become more pro-actively contrarian
  • Develop various forms of insurance selling”

That’s very sensible. In fact, I’ve made similar arguments in this blog (see here and here). However, as we learned after the 2008 crash, Norway’s politicians (and the general public) have little patience for downside volatility along this long-term path. Gordon and I flagged this up in our recent papers on the GPF-G (see here and here). So, while the fund may have an “infinite” time horizon, it doesn’t really behave that way in practice. Interestingly, Dimson et al. pick up on this point:

“The overriding concern in terms of governance is to ensure the legitimacy of GPFG in terms of public support. If the public were to lose confidence in the operation of the Fund that would entail the risk of major changes to the set-up and undermine the current structure. We note that this attitude can lead to underutilization of  the Fund’s distinctive characteristics and excess conservatism which would make it harder for the GPFG to reach its long-run real return targets. Hopefully, public attitudes will evolve over time, aided by good performance and better communication  – by the manager, by the Ministry, by this Council, and by the media.”

So, Dimson et al. are correct on all counts. These long-term giants do have a competitive advantage in financial markets. And this presents SWFs with a real opportunity to generate returns. Domestic legitimacy may be a constraint, but, as the chart below suggests, some of the “giants” have managed to take advantage. We may need a case study of the CPPIB’s communication strategy…

Investing for Infinity

Ashby Monk

I recently came across an intriguing statement (h/t EIU) by Norway’s Finance Minister Sigbjørn Johnsen about the country’s SWF:

“One could say we are investing for infinity.”

I think we’d all agree, that’s a long investment time horizon! Now, Johnsen made this comment back in September while trying to justify why the Norwegian fund was investing in debt from Greece Spain, Italy and Portugal (which wasn’t going over all too well). So, it was probably more political rhetoric than anything concrete.

Still, what are the implications for investment strategy of an “infinite” time horizon? It’s a wonderful thought experiment, in my opinion. So let’s run with it for a second.

I’d say that nearly all of the intellectual horse power of asset managers operating in financial markets today is focused on generating returns in the short to medium term (say 24 months out). If you’re investing with a view to generating returns in 24 years or even 24 decades, how would that affect your investment strategy? Such a time horizon, which is backed up by enormous scale, affords SWFs unparalleled ability to hold risky assets.

So, in my view, it should affect their investment strategies. If SWFs (and their masters) really believe the “investing for infinity” comment, then they need to be putting much more money into long-term asset classes — such as unlisted infrastructure assets, private equity and real estate — where private investors can’t hang over the long term.

The real question then is whether SWFs are doing that; are they taking advantage of their “infinite” time horizon? Some are and some aren’t. Let’s start with Norway, which inspired this discussion. As it turns out, when FM Johnsen made his comment about “infinity”, the Norwegian fund didn’t have a direct infrastructure investment program and was only starting to develop a real estate portfolio. In other words, the “investing for infinity” was a nice soundbite to explain away investments in Greek debt, but it wasn’t an “investment belief” that was driving behavior within the fund. (Granted, that may be in the process of changing thanks to Elroy Dimson.)

Now, let’s look at AIMCo, the Albertan SWF, which is pushing hard into unlisted infrastructure assets and really setting the standards in terms of direct infrastructure investing. In other words, it is moving into an asset class that suits its profile, taking advantage of its inherent characteristics. To me, that’s how a fund with an infinite time horizon should be operating. So, well done, Alberta!

Norwegian SWF Facing Ethics Challenge?

Ashby Monk

Is it the severe jet lag (I haven’t seen a bed in 40+ hours) or am I actually reading a new research report on Norwegian ethical investment lapses? Hard to believe, but EarthRights International has published a 40 pager specifically targeting the Norwegian SWF for unethical investment behavior. Honestly, I can’t think of a single fund that I would expect this to happen to less. No other SWF takes ethical investing as seriously as Norway’s. What gives?

One of the report’s authors, Matthew Smith of EarthRights, had this to say on the Huffington Post:

“…the Norwegian Pension Fund-Global, the world’s second largest sovereign wealth fund, invests in companies that are contributing to severe human rights abuses in Burma, as documented through clandestine investigations by my colleagues and I over the last several years. This puts the Fund in violation of its own standards…our new report essentially screened 15 companies and found that the Fund’s holdings in the companies put it in violation of the Ethical Guidelines. The companies named in the report are some of the world’s biggest, hailing from eight countries, including the US (Chevron), France (Total), South Korea (Daewoo International), China (PetroChina), India (GAIL), and Thailand (PTT/PTTEP).”

So it’s investing in some big conglomerates that do some business in Burma. OK. What say you Norway? The Ministry of Finance (which has purview over investment exclusions) had this for a rebuttal:

“The Fund is invested in some companies, listed elsewhere, that have activity within Burma…The extent of the GPFG’s investments in Burma is therefore sometimes misinterpreted, as the investments refer to multinational companies with activities in many countries and regions…The fact that a company has operations in states controlled by repressive regimes does not, in itself, constitute sufficient grounds to exclude a company from the Fund.”

I’m literally too tired to delve into the nitty gritty here. However, as Gordon and I have argued, domestic legitimacy of the SWF is predicated on the idea that the fund is an ethical investor. So that means EarthRights can potentially inspire some change by threatening the fund’s domestic support through a splashy negative ethics campaign.

In other words, Norway’s SWF is being targeted as much for it’s positive ethical qualities as it is for any negative ones. After all, Chevron has many investors, but there is only one worth half a trillion dollars with a flourishing ethical investment policy that has a track record of divesting “unethical” companies.


After Icelandic Bond Short, SWF Goes Long PIGs

Ashby Monk

One of the big news stories out this week was the Norwegian SWF’s apparent appetite for the debt of the troubled peripheral economies of the Eurozone (Greece, Portugal, and Ireland), which came as a welcome shot in the arm for the entire Eurozone bond market (though this news actually isn’t new…it’s from mid-August). Still, it’s been hard for some to get a sense for why the GPF-G is keen to hold this debt. And, as Felix Salmon points out, there are some pretty wacky explanations out there.

As for me, I cut to the most straightforward explanation: the GPF-G (NBIM) is perhaps the most widely diversified institutional investor in the world, which means it pretty much owns a small piece of almost everything (it is estimated to own 1% of the global stock market). So, why not throw a bit of sovereign debt from these countries into the mix?

Nonetheless, I do acknowledge the potential for a bit of ‘political intrigue’ here. In reading through the pronouncements of the various interested parties, I’m  reminded of when various ME and Asian SWFs spoke out about their intention to stay with the euro, which, in turn, helped to stabilize the currency. In that instance, there was a nagging sense that the pronouncements were a bit self-serving (i.e. they stemmed losses on their Euro portfolio). And, in this instance, Felix Salmon sees something similar:

“I’m also worried about the fact that the Norwegian finance minister is out there talking up his sovereign wealth fund’s book: it introduces an utterly gratuitous level of politicization to a process which should be much more disinterested. If the fund’s managers think that they can outperform their index by loading up on Greek debt, that’s fine. But let’s not turn their trading position into some kind of noble stance: it isn’t, and it shouldn’t be, either.”

True. And another thing to remember is that the Norwegian SWF got into some very hot water when it shorted Icelandic bonds a few years back. To sum up, the trading position of the SWF created a diplomatic incident. Perhaps the SWF has learned its lesson too well?

The Compassionate Investor: Norway’s GPF-G

Ashby Monk

I saw that while many of us were away on vacation in late August (or, in my case, packing, moving and complaining), Norway’s SWF – the Government Pension Fund–Global – announced that it was dropping three corporations from its portfolio due to “grossly unethical activity”. This included two Israeli firms (Africa Israel Investments and Danya Cebus), which are implicated in the construction of settlements, and one Malaysian firm (Samling Global), which has been implicated in environmental degradation.

In justifying the Israeli divestments, the MoF cited the Geneva Convention, UN Security Council resolutions and ICJ advisory opinions, which, according to the MoF, together “have concluded that the construction of Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territory is prohibited”. As for the Malaysian firm, the MoF says it is linked to illegal logging and severe environmental damage in Sarawak and Guyana. According to the GPF-G, these divestments have already been made (despite the firms’ denials of wrongdoing). Since I’ve written at length on the GPF-G’s ethical investment policies (see here and here), I thought I would chime in with some quick thoughts.

I can’t help but find the timing of these announcements rather intriguing. As you may be aware, the GPF-G has had a rough couple of years financially; this was most recently ‘capped’ off by BP’s huge stock price drop. (…by the way, I’ll leave the ethics of the GPF-G’s investment in BP out of this, though I have some colleagues at the SOGE who would be appalled at this oversight…) Anyway, the Norwegian SWF’s value actually dropped by 5.4% in the latest quarter for which results are available.

So, here is my provocative question: Is the announcement of these divestments (and their timing) intended to shore up public opinion about the SWF’s operations during a rather difficult and troubling period?  An outlandish question? Not really. Read this from the Ministry of Finance:

“There is . . . broad support for the ethical framework for responsible management of the Fund. Broad political support for the investment strategy for the Fund provides a democratic underpinning and represents an important contribution to maintaining the investment strategy over time, including in periods of major market fluctuations.”

In other words, the ethical policy (on display with the high profile “naming and shaming” of these three companies) is crucial for sustaining the institution over the long-term.

Now, it’s beyond me to know if the Norwegian SWF actually links its financial performance with its ethical actions. Still, the government and the fund both clearly recognize the importance of these ethical policies in maintaining the fund’s legitimacy by providing a buffer against public criticism during periods of poor returns. (And if you think legitimacy isn’t a big deal for this fund, consider that after the financial crisis the very notion of active investment management was questioned, and the very existence of the NBIM was implicitly threatened.)

And so this may offer some insight into why the GPF-G has been working so hard at publicizing and implementing its ethical stance over the past few years (for a nice example, see this brochure). The Norwegian public today perceives the GPF-G as both an instrument of long-term national welfare (i.e. a SWF) and an expression of Norway’s commitment to global justice. And this combination of ideals offers the GPF-G and the government a useful trade-off: when the former struggles, the government can always press on the latter’s accelerator to maintain public acceptance.

Does this completely explain the latest divestments? Maybe not. But it does offer some useful perspective.


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This website is a project of Professor Gordon L. Clark and Dr. Ashby Monk of the School of Geography and the Environment at the University of Oxford. Their research on sovereign wealth funds is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and The Rotman International Centre for Pension Management.

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