Archive for March, 2009



SAFE? Hardly

Ashby Monk

While the bulk of China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange’s (SAFE) assets (roughly $1.8 trillion) are in U.S. Treasuries, it moved roughly 10% into riskier assets at what looks like the worst time possible: early 2007. As a result, SAFE lost $80 billion dollars, according to the FT

“In what appears a huge misallocation of the nation’s foreign exchange wealth, Chinese holdings of US equities tripled to $100bn between mid-2007 and mid-2008, just before the economic crisis took hold and global equity markets began to tumble. The bulk of those equity investments was made by Safe, which saw foreign exchange reserves under its control grow by more than $400bn over that period.”

With losses like this, it is no wonder SAFE–and its cousin CIC–find safety in secrecy:

“Analysts and Beijing insiders say CIC has learnt from Safe that transparency and openness do not pay and the way to avoid criticism is to avoid outside scrutiny.”

It’s interesting how this view contradicts with the outward impression that the CIC is giving–of an institution moving towards greater transparency. Indeed, the CIC and SAFE are faced with a very difficult juggling act. On the one hand, they are seeking legitimacy in foreign markets. Part of achieving this is through transparency and good governance. On the other hand, as new institutions with new investment mandates, their survival necessitates the perception of legitimacy within China. This means not contradicting local expectations for SWF behavior. As per the above, one way to achieve this is by remaining secretive; thereby not raising alarms even if the behavior is contradictory to local norms.

It is revealing that Chinese politicians were left “furious” about SAFE’s recent losses:

“Wen Jiabao, premier, and a handful of other political leaders are briefed regularly on Safe’s strategy but are said to have been surprised by the size of China’s holdings of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae bonds when those institutions failed last July.”

Is losing $80 billion dollars enough to be seen as behaving illegitimately within China? Probably not, considering the size of these funds, but it is clearly enough to raise concerns among Chinese politicians at the highest levels.

How to Navigate a Crisis: Do Nothing

Ashby Monk

For the next six months, the Qatar Investment Authority will literally do nothing. According to Hussein al-Abdullah, executive director of the QIA, they will only add “doing something” to the agenda in the second half of 2009–at which point they will begin a review of the SWF’s investment strategy. After the hiatus and the review, it is anticipated that QIA will refocus investment activity towards “commodities, food, energy and water”. Clearly, the QIA (like many other SWFs) has suffered considerable losses in the financial crisis and simply wants to take a step back and re-evaluate.

As perhaps the longest-term investors in the world, SWFs are better able to “do nothing” than their institutional cousins (pensions, endowments, etc) that have pressing liabilities. Nevertheless, with distressed assets trading at significant discounts, QIA could better use the next few months by buying up illiquid asset classes that are currently under-priced due to the prevalent liquidity concerns; over the long term, these illiquid investments could turn a nice profit. Nevertheless, of the available options, doing nothing is a better choice than buying high and selling low–a fate many pension plans currently find themselves confronting.

SWFs’ Changing Mandate

Ashby Monk

The financial crisis has changed some SWFs’ investment mandates. Whereas most–if not all– used to be in the business of investing government owned financial assets abroad, today many are increasingly being asked to invest these assets domestically. Struggling local economies and firms demand large capital injections, which in many cases can come only from SWFs.  

This point of view fits with what Knowledge at Wharton wrote today:

“In the wake of the financial meltdown, most of the SWFs in the Middle East have either stopped investing or have become very risk-averse. Instead, they are now turning inward to stimulate their own slumping economies — and thus reducing purchases of foreign assets. “

This is to be expected–isn’t this why these funds were set up in the first place?

It will be really interesting to see what happens to SWFs after this crisis. First, I expect we’ll see a ramp up in SWF assets under management much the way we saw a ramp up in central bank’s foreign exchange reserves coming out of the Asian financial crisis in ’97. Second, these assets will then once again be invested internationally so as to ensure that resources are available if and when they are needed (as they are today).

Should the U.S. tax SWFs?

Ashby Monk

I’m not a Law Professor, so I can’t really say. However, Matthew Melone is a Law Professor, and he just published this paper on the subject:

“These funds are entitled to a tax exemption, not available to private investors, because they are owned by foreign sovereigns. Foreign governments have enjoyed some form of tax exemption in the United States for almost a century. The exemption, informed by notions of sovereign immunity, has generated little controversy until recently. This exemption, however, has now become a subject of debate by tax professionals. More importantly, Congress has recently taken an interest in the taxation of sovereign wealth funds.”

You should also read Vic Fleischer’s paper for a different view on the subject…

CIC: Cash in China

Ashby Monk

The China Investment Corporation has $90 billion in cash ready to invest in a wide range of asset classes, according to CIC Vice President Wang Jianxi at the 11th Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Including cash equivalents, up to 90% of the CIC’s asset base of (what once was) $200 billion is in highly liquid assets. With asset prices so low, the CIC is in an enviably position.

Granted, some of the CIC’s assets will be used to recapitalize struggling Chinese banks. Nevertheless, the CIC can really pick and choose among a myriad of assets globally. The only constraint appears to be lingering political concerns over SWF motivations (despite a desperate need for cash the world over). Indeed, the CIC is reported to be increasing its investments in developing economies (specifically Africa) in order to avoid the high levels of scrutiny in the West.

SWFs to the rescue…

Ashby Monk

…of their sponsors.

Gleb Bryanski and Yelena Fabrichnaya report that Russia will be tapping its Reserve Fund to fill a budget gap of roughly $75 billion, which represents a draw down of 55% of the SWF’s assets. One more year of budget shortfalls and the Reserve Fund could simply disappear.

In most cases, SWFs were set up with a view towards providing governments with much needed capital during a crisis. Whether it is providing capital to fill a yawning unfunded pension liability or offering a stabilizing influence in economies that are overly reliant on volatile commodity prices, all are in some way ‘insurers of last resort’. This has become all too clear during the current economic crisis. As I said the other day, SWF assets will be used by sponsors around the world for the next few years, bringing the assets under management well below current levels.

However, if these funds succeed in staving off economic meltdown, expect resurgence for SWFs coming out of the crisis…much the way forex reserves grew coming out of the ’97 financial crisis.

CIC 2

Ashby Monk

The Economic Observer reports that China is mulling the creation of yet another SWF:

“China’s state-owned assets watchdog was planning to consolidate some companies under the control of the central government (central SOEs) into an asset management firm to better govern state resources.”

This new entity is being referred to as “CIC No. 2″.  It would be an amalgamation of several under performing SOEs and managed by the State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. The difference between this entity and the CIC would be its domestic focus, making it more akin to the Central Huijin Investment Company (a CIC subsidiary).

While the temptation is to view this as an endorsement of CIC’s performance to date, the decision to set up ‘CIC 2′ is based more on a pre-existing policy of consolidating SOEs. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see another SWF coming into shape during this economic crisis.

SWFs: Up in a Downturn?

Ashby Monk

SWF assets under management grew to nearly $4 trillion in 2008, which represents an 18% increase year on year. Considering the financial turmoil and plummeting commodity prices, this is more than a little surprising.

It is safe to assume that this asset accumulation wasn’t achieved through investment returns. Rather, the increase in assets came from new SWFs (such as creation of Russia’s National Welfare Fund) and rising foreign exchange reserves in China.

With the crisis continuing apace, I expect this increase will be followed by a drop over the next few years. Simply put, the crisis means that countries will be tapping their SWFs, which are in many cases the ‘insurers of last resort’. Indeed, Singapore is tapping its reserves for the first time in the country’s history to boost the domestic economy. Also, China has another large domestic stimulus planned. In addition, oil prices remain low, and financial markets have not yet recovered. While the current low market prices may offer long-term investors buying opportunities, the political will to invest government owned assets in financial markets may have waned in view of the losses incurred over the past 18 months.

I expect 2008 to be the high water mark for SWF assets under management this decade.

SWF Blog Revival

We’re back.

Much has happened since we closed up shop at our last SWF blog; worsening economic circumstances and the changing nature of the SWF debate warrant a revival of our discussion and posting. So, Professor Clark and I have decided that, over the next 18 months, we will:

1) Occasionally post our views and thoughts on issues pertaining to SWFs;

2) update you on new research we’re doing; and

3) do some more Q&As.

Snoop around this website for details on our Leverhulme funded SWF project. Also, we’ve uploaded all of our past Q&As and the first few papers we’ve completed as part of this project. Comments are welcome!

More to come…

Ashby and Gordon

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About

This website is a project of Professor Gordon L. Clark and Dr. Ashby Monk of the School of Geography and the Environment at the University of Oxford. Their research on sovereign wealth funds is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and The Rotman International Centre for Pension Management.

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