Archive for December, 2009



Monopsonistic Pricing

Ashby Monk

Joseph Chaney and George Chen of Reuters have an interesting article on the CIC’s stingy habits; the authors call the fund a “cheapskate” for capping their M&A fees at $3 million (no matter the size of the deal).

“So while CIC has shown a willingness to dish out cash for investments, it has tended to keep a tight fist on the fees granted to banks that advise them.”

I’m not surprised by this. The CIC is perhaps the world’s largest ‘strategic’ investor in a market that has seen M&A activity collapse. As with any monopsony – one buyer, many sellers — the sellers (in this case the M&A service providers) are going to take a major pricing hit.

Yet again, we see another example of how  SWFs, such as the CIC, have seen their relative, competitive position improve as a result of this financial crisis.

Copenhaggling

Ashby Monk

The UN climate change conference is underway in Copenhagen, and the haggling over a political agreement on how to deal with climate change has begun. Financial markets clearly have a role therein, probably in the form of a carbon market and the pricing of negative externalities. So, it is not surprising to see Norway’s SWF, the GPF-G, take up a place of some prominence in the discussions.

The GPF-G is not only one of the world’s biggest investors, but it also has an explicit ethical commitment to corporate engagement and to ensuring that the fund is not associated with companies that pose a risk to social and environmental justice.  As section 5 of the Guidelines for Management make clear:

“The Fund shall not make investments that entail an unacceptable risk that the Fund is contributing to unethical acts or omissions” including violations of humanitarian principles, human rights, gross corruption, and severe environmental damage.

So, what’s the SWF looking to achieve in Copenhagen? It is campaigning for some sort of mechanism to price externalities in financial markets, in effect taking up the position espoused by Ronald Coase. The fund noted:

“We are stuck with a global financial system that doesn’t internalise the externalities, such as setting an effective price on greenhouse gases.”

Additionally, the fund came to announce some of its own policies on the environment. This will raise awareness about it’s ongoing role in the fight against global warming (which in turn solidifies its domestic legitimacy).

Front Runners Should Pay Dearly

Ashby Monk

McKinsey has finally fired Kumar for his involvement in front running SWFs. As I noted previously, he revealed to a friend that an Abu Dhabi SWF was about to make a big investment in AMD. This individual–a world-renowned hedge fund manager–then used the information to place some trades.

It’s hard to conceive of any excuse for why Kumar would tell a hedge fund billionaire about a client’s looming transaction. To even mention a clients name to someone outside of a deal team is, in my view, blatantly negligent. So, this termination is overdue.

Even Adam Smith, who attacked most forms of government interference in the economic process, noted that the market necessitated the credible application of the rule of law. I think the rules governing the use of insider information are particularly important in this regard.

Weekend Reading

Ashby Monk

Eckart Woertz was apparently a busy guy this week; he’s just released a new paper entitled, “Implications of Dubai’s Debt Troubles.” It’s quite good, as it looks forward rather than rehearses the ‘how-we-got-here’ arguments. Also, this chart is just plain cool: Dubai Inc.

Alaska’s Looking To Learn

Ashby Monk

Back in June, I noted that Alaska’s SWF was planning some interesting organizational changes so as to facilitate learning. Specifically, the fund was planning to create a series of “mini-permanent funds” that would allow Alaska’s board to get some insights into how sophisticated asset managers operate.

Pat Forgey had an article yesterday reporting that this plan is now coming into fruition:

“The fund’s Chief Investment Officer Jeff Scott is calling the money managers who will be hired ”external CIOs,” and expects each of the four managers will be given $500 million to invest as mini-permanent funds, for a total of $2 billion.”

What’s interesting about this policy is that the managers themselves will choose their own mix of stocks, bonds, and investments that they think will generate the highest returns. These aren’t traditional asset allocations with specific mandates in mind. These four funds will, in effect, be ‘mini-permanent funds’, which the big Permanent Fund will watch closely so as to learn.

It’s a very interesting organizational innovation that I’ll be keeping a close eye on.

Updates

Ashby Monk

A couple of logistical updates:

  • I’ve once again made some changes / additions to the “healthy competition” page.
  • I’ve also added an option that allows you to subscribe to posts by email; just plug your email address in at the right, and you’ll be notified every time we publish anything.

SWFs Singing In The Rain

Ashby Monk

In my view, SWFs’ internal capabilities have actually improved as a result of the financial crisis. With so many finance professionals losing their jobs over the past few years, these funds have been able to pick up some serious talent (that they might not have been able to afford pre-crisis). In fact, the CICSAFEADIA, and the Future Fund have all made announcements about hiring in the past month alone.

This hiring spree just reminds me of the strategic advantage that long-term, well-resourced investors have during a crisis. As we have seen, SWFs have the ability to pick up illiquid investments at fire sale prices. They can hire all-star talent for the price of a mere mortal. Moreover, the international political problems that plagued these funds have been pushed under the carpet due to the global economic turmoil. And lets not forget that the ever-present fear of inflation has now provided certain funds with a legitimate reason to invest in–what has started to feel like–every commodity company in the world.

I’m starting to think that some SWFs don’t view the past two years as being a crisis at all; they’ve been singing in the rain! (Except for Dubai World of course…)

Is London the Global SWF Hub?

Ashby Monk

Alistair Darling, Chancellor of the Exchequer, had a rather interesting editorial in the Times today. In it, he makes the case for a reinvigorated City (i.e. financial district). It’s a pretty straightforward argument, which is based on the fact that the UK is absolutely dependent on the competitiveness of London’s financial services industry. However, one comment in particular struck me as rather provocative: he claimed that London manages 50 percent of the world’s SWF assets.

Really? I find this interesting because an October report by International Financial Services London (IFSL) noted that the UK trailed the US in practically all categories of assets under management (conventional funds, hedge funds, pension funds, mutual funds, etc). More significantly, the report decided not to comment on sovereign wealth funds, as it had no reliable data on the global dissemination of assets. Specifically, the report states:

“London is an important centre in the management of sovereign wealth funds assets, although it is difficult to estimate the size of funds managed there due to lack of precise data.”

So, a skeptic could look at Darling’s claim and assume he chose to single out London’s global dominance in SWF management because it could not be substantiated through data!

Nonetheless, let’s give Alistair Darling the benefit of the doubt and assume he actually knows what he is talking about. In this case, why would London have a disproportionately large share of SWF assets under management vis-a-vis the US? I have a couple of guesses:

First, Darling’s calculation may have included the assets that SWFs themselves are managing in London. After all, a number of large funds, including the Kuwait Investment Authority, Brunei Investment Authority, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Temasek, GIC and others have offices set up in London. To my knowledge, London has more SWF offices than New York. So, depending on how these offices are tallied up, this could help to explain Darling’s claim.

Second, London may in fact just be a more attractive jurisdiction for SWFs, as it may be perceived to offer more political security than New York. To be sure, US policymakers were much more willing to criticize and scold SWFs in 2007 for a lack of transparency and poor governance practices than were UK policymakers. It’s thus reasonable to assume that this has helped secure London’s place as the SWF hub.

Third, London is closer to the biggest SWFs than is New York. Don’t discount proximity in this equation. My experience is that SWFs require a lot of face time and hand holding, which gives London bankers a leg up on New Yorkers.

I’m sure we could come up with other reasons for this abnormal distribution of SWF assets. However, before we go any further, I’d like to see where Darling got his data.

Are ‘Sovereign Debt Funds’ Wise?

Ashby Monk

Isthimar and its parent Dubai World have been having a rough go of it since September. However, the situation got much worse over the long weekend. I don’t want to spend too much analysing this, as it has been on the front page of every newspaper in the world. However, I do want to think more about ‘sovereign debt funds’–which I would define as an SWF that receives its capital almost exclusively from the issuance of debt. In short, I wonder if it is sound policy for a government to borrow funds (through their wholly owned SWF) for the explicit purpose of investing in riskier assets?

There are clear benefits to such a policy, as the fund is issuing debt at a favorable interest rate thanks to the sovereign backstop, which would seem to suggest that the SWF could return (over the long-term) more than their debt service (i.e. make a profit). But, as we have seen recently, such a policy comes with substantial risks.

This situation reminds me of pension obligation bonds (POBs) in the United States. POBs are general obligation bonds issued by the (state or local) government for which the proceeds are immediately handed over to the public pension fund for investment in riskier assets.  The governments that issue POBs are seeking to fill pension funding gaps in plans by taking advantage of an actuarial arbitrage that assumes pension assets will out pace debt servicing costs. So, in my view, the economic principles that underpin POBs are similar to those that underpin Dubai World. So long as times are good, these instruments / institutions look wise. Once a crisis hits, it’s pure folly.

Indeed, in 2007, governments that issued POBs were probably pretty happy with themselves. And yet, their perception of these instruments today is probably quite different, as the bond proceeds that were invested through the pension fund have been dramatically discounted. This means that the objective of filling the pension gap has not been achieved and, moreover, the governments still have to pay off the debt. Significantly, it’ll be the citizens / taxpayers who pay in the long-term.

It is for this reason that former New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine called POBs “The dumbest idea I ever heard…It’s speculating the way I would have speculated in my bond position at Goldman Sachs.” In the future, will we say the same thing about sovereign debt funds I wonder? Time will tell…

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This website is a project of Professor Gordon L. Clark and Dr. Ashby Monk of the School of Geography and the Environment at the University of Oxford. Their research on sovereign wealth funds is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and The Rotman International Centre for Pension Management.

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