Archive for April, 2010



China’s Strategic Investments

Ashby Monk

On Friday, I gave a paper entitled “The China Investment Corporation: The Rise of a Strategic Investor.” In my talk, I basically rehearsed the arguments that Gordon and I put forward in our recent paper on the CIC. In order to keep the discussion lively, I offered up what I thought to be a somewhat controversial conclusion: I argued that the historical and political architecture of the CIC implies that it cannot do anything but pursue strategic and political objectives, albeit in conjunction with (…or even under the cover of…) commercial and financial objectives.

Interestingly, my audience was more than willing to accept this conclusion; it seemed to inspire only minimal debate (perhaps I was too convincing…or boring). In fact, I was very surprised to see a smart, young PhD candidate from Clark University also come to the exact same conclusion about the CIC in a presentation right after mine (through a different set of observations and methods).

I guess I hadn’t realized that people already view the CIC as being politicized (at least in the US), since the Chinese fund has gone to lengths to reject anything but commercial motivations in their investment strategy. As Lou Jiwei has said (and repeated many times):

“What national strategy? Our strategy is long-term risk-adjusted returns.”

I just came across a Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco paper by Titan Alon, Galina Hale, and Joao Santos entitled “What Is China’s Capital Seeking in a Global Environment?” It suggests that strategic investing is indeed part of a broader Chinese national strategy.

“While China heavily regulates many cross-border transactions and portfolio capital outflows are still very limited, direct investment overseas by Chinese companies has mushroomed in recent years. China’s total foreign holdings acquired through mergers and acquisitions (M&A), basically nonexistent 20 years ago, reached over $87 billion by the end of 2008.”

The report indicates that the full range of Chinese investors are looking to advance national and geopolitical interests, targeting, in particular, resource industries. This includes the country’s SWFs.

Whatever your perceptions about the CIC’s activities, it is interesting to see that public opinion (and that of the FRBSF) has not accepted that the SWF is pursuing strictly commercial and financial aims, which was ostensibly why the international community came together to form the Santiago Principles. I guess the International Forum will have another agenda item for the May meeting…

AAG Annual Meeting Roundup

Ashby Monk

I count myself as lucky to have participated in the SWF panel discussion on Friday evening in Washington DC at the AAG Annual Meeting. As embarrassing as this is to admit, it was the most entertaining and thought-provoking 100 minutes I’ve had in a long while. There is no way I can do justice to the conversation that took place, but I’ll try to provide some generic thoughts that I came across in my notepad this morning. For fear of misquoting or misinterpreting someone, I’ll leave these anonymous:

Coping mechanisms: Policymakers view SWFs as a way to maintain popular, domestic institutions and agendas that would otherwise contradict with the creeping institutions of global capitalism. As such, SWFs are simply coping mechanisms for states increasingly integrated into the global economy. Policymakers today recognize that SWFs offer a way to maintain popular, domestic institutions that would otherwise contradict with the institutions of global capitalism.

Irony: Through SWFs, a growing number of states are further integrating into global markets. However, SWFs are not evidence of “convergence” even if they are a convergent policy tool. Instead, these funds exist to engage with markets to mute the convergent and destabilizing impacts of global capitalism at the local level. In short, they engage with markets so as to mute the impact of markets. Herein lies the great irony.

Sovereignty: SWFs are a way for small nations — without any real power or significance on the global stage – to assert their sovereignty. SWFs are new “spaces of engagement” that allow for smaller countries to have some expression of their interests realized at a global level.

Destabilization: SWFs are not a solution to global-macro imbalances. In fact, they are a sign of macro-weakness. SWFs are the band-aid for a much deeper problem. So, as long as SWFs exist, we’ll know that deeper macro problems have not been resolved.

SWF Inputs: The idiosyncratic histories and cultures among SWFs have led to variable inputs in terms of financial services and products. In order to sell into these funds, asset managers are having to renovate their operations in order to match up with this increasingly important financial actor. In practice, this has resulted in investors locating nearby SWFs and working to nourish the ever important SWF relationships that inevitably lead to new business (i.e. mandates).

SWF Outputs: One panelist asked, “What are the implications of the rise of SWFs for corporate governance?” There was a sense that two problems existed in this domain.

  • First, SWFs are, in many cases, not taking up their responsibilities as shareholders due to national security concerns, which leaves managers without the discipline of shareholders. This can, in turn, lead to a variety of principal agent problems.
  • Second, in cases where SWFs ask for board seats (QIA in Volkswagen), some worried that the secretive SWFs will export a sub-optimal form of governance to corporate boards (i.e. secretive and non-transparent).

Identity crisis: Over the past few years, countries around the world have made attempts to import anglo-american models of corporate governance into their SWFs. This was done to achieve legitimacy in international markets.  Over the next few years, these models will be re-defined and re-worked to match up with domestic notions of legitimacy. The  outcome will be a hybrid form and function that expresses the national interests of the sponsor.

As you can tell, panelists came with a variety of perspectives and opinions. It was well worth the trip…

Weekend in Washington

Ashby Monk

The Oxford SWF Project is in Washington DC this weekend. When we’re not on the roof-deck at Lauriol Plaza, we’ll be at the 2010 AAG Annual Meeting.

We’ve organized a panel session today on the political geography of SWFs. It should be a really interesting discussion, as the panelists all bring a variety of different perspectives. My talk on the panel will be a synthesized version of our latest paper, “Sovereignty in the Era of Global Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Power of Finance.”

I’ll also be presenting another paper earlier in the day on the China Investment Corporation. However, I’m pretty sure I’ll be talking to myself up there. As (bad) luck would have it, Paul Krugman’s keynote speech is in the exact same time slot. Honestly, if I had a choice to go to my own presentation or Paul Krugman’s keynote…I’d choose Krugman’s keynote. Who knows, maybe nobody will show up, and I’ll sneak over there…

New Research: Sovereignty in the Era of Global Capitalism

Ashby Monk

Gordon and I have finally finished our big, theoretical paper on the rise of SWFs. It’s been a long time coming, but hopefully it was worth the wait. The paper is entitled, “Sovereignty in the Era of Global Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Power of Finance.” Here is the abstract:

“Over the past few decades, the institutional logics of the capitalist market and the bureaucratic state have been forced into association at an increasing rate through processes we have come to know as ‘globalization’ and ‘financialization’. The power of financial markets threatens governments around the world, from the communist to the most conservative. In response, governments have sought ways of realizing their interests in a rapidly changing world. Nothing illustrates this phenomenon more than the rise of sovereign wealth funds; governments have been using these special purpose vehicles to invest assets in private financial markets at an increasing rate, independent of their variety of capitalism. While SWFs are an implicit acceptance by the state of the power of finance, they are, however, also an attempt by the state to leverage finance and filter global capitalism’s transformative forces. Drawing on institutional theory and economic geography, we conceptualize the impetus behind SWFs’ existence. We conclude that SWFs exist to preserve local autonomy and state sovereignty by harnessing the power of finance.”

Get it here or here. Comments and criticism are always welcome.

ADIA: Hamed Replaces Ahmed

Ashby Monk

It turns out I was right to be skeptical last week when Middle Eastern and French newspapers started reporting that Khalifa Mohammed Al Kindi was the new ADIA chief. (These papers seem to have misinterpreted a decree about a board reshuffle within ADIC…not ADIA. I have to say, I’m particularly surprised that Le Figaro and Liberation got this so wrong, as both are highly respected papers…at least they were when I lived in France.)

Anyway, credible news out today has the new ADIA successor as Sheikh Hamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. He will succeed his brother, the late Sheikh Ahmed bin Zayed al Nahyan, who recently died in a unfortunate glider accident in Morocco.

Sheikh Hamed is a royal family member that currently heads up the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince’s Court and is chairman of the Higher Corporation of Specialized Economy Zones. He is the half brother Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan, president of the United Arab Emirates.

IFC Guides SWFs to the Investment Frontier

Ashby Monk

The International Finance Corporation (IFC) has just announced that it is launching a new $800 million “IFC African, Latin American, and Caribbean Fund”, which will be managed by IFC Asset Management Company. A member of the World Bank Group, the IFC is one of the few international financial institutions that focus exclusively on bolstering the private sector in the developing world.

What I find interesting about this fund is the divergent interests of the various limited partners. As part of the deal, the IFC has itself committed $200 million. And other LPs apparently include the Dutch pension fund PGGM, the Korea Investment Corporation; the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and an anonymous fund from Saudi Arabia. So, we have a private sector pension fund with explicit liabilities (PGGM), a reserve investment corporation (KIA), a commodity fund (SOF), and a secretive Middle Eastern fund (SAMA or PIF).

These investors represent a diverse set of institutional objectives and constraints, which tells me one thing: this new fund is purely about making solid returns in the developing world. Investors such as PGGM can’t play around too much with “double bottom line” investing in places like Africa. As such, the IFC has managed to convince each of these investors that it will sniff out legitimate investment opportunities in some of the most difficult investment environments in the world. That’s great news. I’m a big fan of the IFC and its mission: they are funneling investment capital into the ‘frontier markets’ that need it most.

But, alas, it’s not all good news, I’m afraid. If I’m not mistaken, this new fund is a rebranded version of the “IFC Sovereign Fund Initiative”, which was originally meant to be a $1 billion equity fund that would facilitate investment in the same regions. So, this latest announcement suggests to me that the IFC fell well short of its original funding target. Apparently, World Bank President Robert Zoellick has some additional work to do to convince the world’s investors that “…developing countries have high-quality investment opportunities…”

I’m not really sure why, though. The IFC has a remarkable track record. Its average internal rate of return over the past 20 years has exceeded 20 percent! As this illustrates, where there is risk (…and there is plenty of risk in places like Africa…), there are plenty of opportunities for return! Now, if we could just convince Norway to get involved…many more would join in.

Get to know Nauru

Ashby Monk

Did you know that the Republic of Nauru has a SWF? Actually, perhaps this is a more appropriate question: Have you ever heard of the Republic of Nauru? Chances are that the world’s smallest independent republic—an Island Nation in Microneasia—has not come to your attention. Still, Nauru has some great lessons for countries considering a SWF. Why? Because it appears to have unsuccessfully used a SWF to manage its resource rents. Indeed, the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust, which was established in 1968, has been almost entirely exhausted (i.e. squandered) due to poor governance and mismanagement of funds.

From a research perspective, this is a golden opportunity, one that Martin Gould of Australia’s Treasury has not missed. He has a new research paper that uses the Nauru fund—and those of Kiribati, Timor-Leste and PNG—to outline some important lessons on how to ensure that SWFs achieve their objectives. As Gould notes:

“A key challenge for developing countries endowed with natural resources is to transform those resources into sustained improvements in living standards. A number of Pacific island countries have utilised sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) to manage government revenue from exhaustible natural resources with the aim of improving development outcomes. Experience in the region has been mixed — some SWFs have aided intergenerational equity and macroeconomic stability while others have struggled to bring about improvements in wellbeing.”

I like this paper, as it draws some really useful lessons from the experiences of these Island nations. Here are Gould’s take-aways:

  • If you have a high debt burden and a high borrowing cost, you should use your sovereign wealth to retire debt NOT set up a SWF. The chances of making returns within the SWF sufficient to justify not retiring debt are low (and the investment risks required to do so are high).
  • All SWFs need a clear objective and mandate, with strict withdrawal guidelines and borrowing rules.
  • The SWF should be integrated into the broader budget process.
  • SWF assets should (in most cases) be held off-shore. This will mitigate Dutch Disease and increase the number of investment options.
  • SWFs must be designed and governed according to international best-practice. For example, it needs professional investment management. And transparency around the operations of the SWF is vital.

I think these are all eminently sensible. And given that Gould draws these insights from successful and unsuccessful case studies, I think the advice is that much more powerful. In short, if you sponsor a SWF, you should spend some time getting to know Nauru and it’s failed attempt to manage commodity wealth through a SWF.

GIC Frets (Needlessly) Over Liquidity Risks

Ashby Monk

Gillian Tett’s article in the FT today on the changing perceptions of liquidity risk among SWFs has me captivated; I’ve already caught myself, deep in thought, staring out various windows at least five times. What’s got my thoughts so provoked? Well, Tett appears to be privy to an internal process of evaluation taking place within the Government Investment Corporation of Singapore that could see some dramatic changes to the way it manages its money. Specifically, she portends a shift from external (co-mingled) management of assets to in-house management.

The article’s peg is the realization within GIC that the “Yale Model” isn’t a panacea for long-term investors. This is sensible enough. However, it seems to me that the GIC’s concern is more nuanced than this; the fund is less worried about widespread diversification of assets (which is espoused by Yale Modelers) than it is about some (recently unearthed) liquidity risks embedded in their supposedly “long-term” investments. As Tett notes,

“…in the past two years, sovereign funds discovered that the long-term mantra provides far less protection than previously thought. For by investing in private equity and hedge funds, the GIC (and others) ended up being exposed to the vagaries of their co-investors – and some of those had short-term horizons, or mark-to-market triggers. Thus what hurt groups such as the GIC was not just the issue of asset correlation, but a contagion of investor style as well.”

So, the GIC’s problem is apparently not with highly diversified, long-term investments—it, instead, has a problem with the investment vehicles through which it undertakes these investments; namely private equity and hedge funds.

Tett seems to imply that the GIC was forced into some “asset fire sales or unseemly investment exits” due to the “mark-to-market triggers” of its co-investors (i.e. the other limited partners) in the private equity or hedge funds. This, Tett suggests, has some within the GIC hot and bothered, as they now recognize they are taking on the liquidity risks of their fellow LPs!

I’ll be honest. I’m confused by this whole thing. As a former employee of a private equity fund (…yes, I was once seduced by the power of the dark side of the Force…), I was under the impression that limited partnerships had explicit lock-up periods that, in effect, precluded any “co-investors” (i.e. LPs) from bailing out. This is crucial for seeing any investments through to a profitable exit! In fact, I thought LPs usually had  no right to demand that sales be made at all! So, I have to say it, the whole premise of the GIC’s internal deliberations strikes me as being somewhat off …

Nonetheless, it’s been a while since I’ve seen the inside of an LP contract. So I acknowledge that the rules of the game may have changed. Indeed, when talking about hedge funds and private equity, Tett keeps using the term “co-investor” instead of “limited partner”, so maybe GIC had signed itself up to some other types of private equity or hedge fund investments? In any case, let’s play along with this for a moment. Tett then asks:

“That raises some big questions about how the GIC (and others) should conduct themselves. Should they only co-invest with similar investors in the future? Could they now demand detailed lists of their co-investors (even if they hate providing such data themselves)? Could they ask to be paid for assuming illiquidity risk? Or should they dump external managers altogether, and bring that activity “in-house”?”

More to the point, investors need to understand the nature of the co-investment (i.e. LP) contracts they are signing; if they have explicit lock-up periods that prevent the type of “stop loss” or “trigger” sales that Tett refers to, then this shouldn’t really be a problem at all. However, in cases where a co-investment has no lock-up period, then you better understand your co-investors’ liquidity constraints. Otherwise, their problems will become your problems.

In short, I think the GIC is fretting needlessly over the liquidity risks associated with PE or HF investments. This should simply be addressed as part of the due diligence process associated with the original investment in the fund. In fact, when it comes to these type of investments, one of the major concerns among investors is not being able to get at their money if they really need it…the GIC appears to be worried about just the opposite outcome.

Weekend Reading

Ashby Monk

I’ve come across a few interesting papers this week that are worth a read (or at least a skim):

First, Jason Hart of the University of Western Australia has a new paper entitled, “Revenue Funds Counteract the Determinants of Dutch Disease: Lessons for Western Australia.” The paper examines the current resource related problems facing Western Australia and draws implications from six countries with commodity funds. Hart shows that SWFs are useful tools for responsible fiscal management (albeit non-essential). He concludes that…

“…the Western Australian government has the opportunity to avoid Dutch disease through a Sovereign Wealth Fund style revenue fund, which can make government revenue from royalties sustainable and reduce the impact of commodity prices on the exchange rate, and in doing so reduce the economy wide adjustments that a volatile exchange rate causes.”

Second, Mehmet Caner and Thomas Grennes have a new paper out entitled “Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Norwegian Experience.” The paper sets out to analyze the performance of the Norwegian Fund and its effects on world capital markets and on Norwegian investors. They conclude that Norway has (basically) become the owner of a publicly managed mutual fund and the “success” of the fund is a function of the risk preference of Norwegian society:

“…whether it has been an effective agent for Norwegians depends partly on the risk preferences of its citizens.”

Finally, Gordon and I released a new paper on the rise of the CIC. We explore the nature of the “deal” that was struck when American markets were opened up to China. In effect, the origins of the CIC can be found, in part, in an American commitment to “normalise” China’s role in the global economy. We’d love to hear your comments. Get it here.

Enjoy your weekend!

ADIA Successor Named?

Ashby Monk

Middle Eastern media outlets are reporting (see here and here) that Khalifa Mohammed Al Kindi has been chosen to lead the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. If this news is legit, Al Kindi will replace the recently deceased Sheikh Ahmed bin Zayed Al Nahyan at the helm of one of the biggest (if not the biggest) SWFs in the world.

I remain a bit skeptical about the story; if only because nobody else seems interested (apart from two respectable French newspapers; see here and here). Still, Al Kindi would make sense for the job. He is already the Chairman of Invest AD and is part of the Abu Dhabi inner circle.

Here is a bio for Al Kindi from Businessweek:

“H.E. Khalifa Mohammed Al Kindi is the Managing Director and Director at Abu Dhabi Investment Council. Between 1989 and 1990, He served as the Finance Director of Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). Mr. Al Kindi serves as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Abu Dhabi Investment Company. He serves as a Director of International Bank of Asia Ltd., Hong Kong and has over 15 years’ experience as an investment banker as well as holding a number of Directorships in various public corporations. He serves as a Director for Arcapita Bank B.S.C and Abu Dhabi Aviation and International Petroleum Investment Company. Mr. Al Kindi has been a Member of International Advisory Board of Allianz AG since January 1, 2006. He served as the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of Arab Banking Corp. Mr. Al Kindi served as a Director of Oasis International Leasing Company Pjsc until April 2006 and ABC International Bank PLC. He served as a Director of Arab Banking Corp. Mr. Al Kindi holds a B.Sc. in Economics from East Michigan University.”

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This website is a project of Professor Gordon L. Clark and Dr. Ashby Monk of the School of Geography and the Environment at the University of Oxford. Their research on sovereign wealth funds is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and The Rotman International Centre for Pension Management.

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