Archive for May, 2010



Weekend Reading

Ashby Monk

It’s a very busy day down at the research factory. Nonetheless, I did come across two papers that are worth quickly flagging:

First, Gawdat Bahgat of the National Defense University in DC has a new paper out in Global Policy entitled, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: An Assessment”. Could be good.

Second, Jonathon Moses has a chapter in an edited volume on the ‘development state’ entitled, “Foiling the Resource Curse: wealth, equality, oil and the Norwegian State.” Another topical piece.

Have a nice weekend!

SWFs Increasingly Going It Alone

Ashby Monk

Last week, Institutional Investor hosted one of their “Global Sovereign Funds Roundtables” in London.

As is typical with these large conferences, the attendees were given a hand-held device for quick response polling. This type of audience polling is actually pretty cool, as it allows for dynamic and interactive discussion.

And it generates data! Indeed, I just came across the ‘electronic audience polling results’ over on Institutional Investor’s Sovereign Funds Central. There are quite a few interesting nuggets of information in the data. However, I was most surprised to see the extent to which SWFs are moving (or planning to move) asset management in-house:

  • In the wake of the crisis, 40% of the respondents said SWFs were reducing the number of their external managers (47% saw no noticeable change while only 13% saw an increase).
  • 40% said they were already increasing the proportion of assets managed in-house (34% said they were staying the same while 26% said they were decreasing).
  • 80% said they were seeking to grow their internal capacities so as to be able to manage more of their assets in-house in the future.

In short, there appears to be a widespread trend among SWFs to manage assets internally.

I’m a bit surprised by this. One would have thought that the recent crisis and ensuing volatility might have pushed SWFs to outsource more of their assets. At the very least, outsourcing would provide SWFs with some political cover domestically if returns went south again; i.e. the SWF could dump the under-performing manager and get a new one. If the SWF is the asset manager, the blame for poor returns will fall squarely on its shoulders.

This then raises the question as to why SWFs would want to take on the risk (politically and financially) of managing these assets themselves. The obvious answer is cost; good asset managers don’t come cheaply. So bringing the asset management in house may be cheaper.

Another potential explanation pops up in the conference data: the sponsoring government may be looking to exert more influence over the investment decisions. Indeed, 73% of the respondents noted that there was a definite government influence within the SWFs’ governance structure. In other words, government representatives were chairing or sitting on committees.

Perhaps these government representatives would like to have more influence over where the assets are placed. Put another way, this may be a way to facilitate more ‘strategic’ investing by placing the actual investment decision under the influence of government rather than just the asset allocation decision.

I acknowledge that this interpretation may be a bit of a stretch, but it’s a bit more intriguing (i.e. provocative) than the more obvious ‘cost saving’ interpretation. And given the medium (i.e. a blog post), I’m more interested in thinking about the intrigue than the obvious…

State-Capitalism, the Political Trilemma, and SWFs

Ashby Monk

The fall of communism illustrated the futility of command economies. Indeed, most of the world has come to recognize The Market as the most efficient and effective tool for economic coordination. However, in accepting the importance of The Market, governments have been forced to cede some of their autonomy to the marketplace in order to facilitate economic efficiency.

I think this is the point that Dani Rodrik is getting at when he talks about the “Political Trilemma”. In short, he thinks that the Greek crisis illustrates the irreconcilable forces and institutions at work in the world economy:

“Deep down, the crisis is yet another manifestation of what I call “the political trilemma of the world economy”: economic globalization, political democracy, and the nation-state are mutually irreconcilable. We can have at most two at one time. Democracy is compatible with national sovereignty only if we restrict globalization. If we push for globalization while retaining the nation-state, we must jettison democracy. And if we want democracy along with globalization, we must shove the nation-state aside and strive for greater international governance.”

Dani Rodrik is around three or four times smarter than I am, so I’m compelled to accept the above as true.

Still, while many states have given up some autonomy as part of their embrace of The Market, others have been unwilling to turn themselves entirely over to the liberal project. Indeed, some states have turned to hybrid systems of economic coordination that try to combine principles of the old command economy with those of free markets. This has been called “State Capitalism”, and Eurasia’s Ian Bremmer has a nice description of how it shapes up:

“Within these countries, political elites use state-owned and politically loyal, privately owned companies to dominate entire economic sectors — like oil, natural gas, aviation, shipping, power generation, arms production, telecommunications, metals, minerals, petrochemicals, and other industries. They finance all these institutions with the help of increasingly large pools of surplus foreign cash known as sovereign wealth funds…In the process, the state uses markets to create wealth that can be directed as political officials see fit. The ultimate motive is not economic (maximizing growth) but political (maximizing the state’s power and the leadership’s chances of survival).”

That doesn’t sound very appealing, does it. Moreover, State Capitalism doesn’t seem to be a policy espoused by democracies. So, in that sense, Rodrik’s “Trilemma” seems to be intact.

But this got me thinking. Could democracies use some of the tools of State Capitalism to avoid Rodrik’s Political Trilemma? After all, every country today faces domestic challenges associated with the creeping forces of global capitalism (e.g. environmental concerns, tax competition, immigration, social welfare erosion, etc.). And every country would like to have a bit more autonomy in the increasingly globalized world; if just to minimize their vulnerability to crises. We can all agree that economic globalization puts inexorable stress on domestic political and social institutions. Indeed, as economic integration has accelerated, nation-states have lost much of their self determination. (Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy surely understand this today if they didn’t a couple of months ago.)

However, in the face of these outside forces, (Linda Weiss teaches us that) bureaucrats and policymakers have found coping solutions to help manage the depredations of globalization. And, in my view, this is where some of the tools of State Capitalism could be useful. For example, through a SWF, states have the ability to mute some of the nefarious domestic impacts stemming from globalization, through stabilization or insurance, all the while reaping some of its rewards. (This, by the way, is one of the points I made in a recent academic paper.)

I guess what I’m saying is that SWFs, which are a part of the State Capitalism toolkit, could be situated at the intersection between political democracy, economic globalization and nation state sovereignty so as to avoid the Political Trilemma. In fact, looking around the world, I can already see democracies taking up SWFs for just this purpose. Take Norway as an example. The GPF-G helped to mute the effects of the financial crisis. Ireland’s NPRF was also used in this manner. Look at Chile. Look at France. It seems to me that democracies around the world are starting to use SWFs to help overcome the Political Trilemma.

Do SWFs offer a permanent solution to the Trilemma? Probably not. But that’s for another post…

Qatar’s Busy SWF

Ashby Monk

Is there a more active SWF in the world today than the Qatar Investment Authority? I’m not sure. It definitely rivals the China Investment Corporation. Stories about the QIA — and its various subsidiaries — seem to pop up on an almost daily basis.

For example, Qatar just bought Harrod’s. It just set up a billion dollar infrastructure fund in Indonesia. It recently bought the US Embassy building in London. It’s a large shareholder in VW. It’s launching a hotel in Cuba. The list of deals and strategic investments is a long one. In fact, one source puts the Qatari investment spree to date at around 45 billion pounds! This is pretty darn remarkable given that the fund was only set up in 2005.

And I’m not the only one who’s noticed. Cahal Milmo of The Independent has a nice article outlining the recent history of the Qatari wealth fund:

“By an accident of geography, this one-time impoverished British protectorate, whose earnings once came largely from pearl fishing, now finds itself sitting on 26 trillion cubic metres of gas – the world’s third largest reserve – and, as a consequence, a per capita income of $83,000 that is second on the planet only to the banking enclave of Liechtenstein

The advent of sovereign wealth funds – those seemingly bottomless reserves of state-owned money available for investment by cash-rich countries – has been one of the more dramatic developments on the world’s stock exchanges in recent years. But none can match the speed and scale with which Qatar has set about spending its surplus cash to acquire, either in whole or in part, some of the oldest and biggest companies in markets from Britain and France to Morocco, Sudan, the Seychelles and Indonesia.

After securing a sizable stake in the London Stock Exchange three years ago, the QIA has moved with almost breathtaking speed to buy shares in the Sainsbury’s supermarket chain, the Barclays and Credit Suisse banks and the third-largest stake in Volkswagen. There has even been a deal between the country and Fidel Castro’s Communist Cuba to build a 250-bedroom luxury hotel on the island’s Cayo Largo…”

It’s interesting. I’ve actually come to see how active the QIA has been indirectly. Indeed, a large proportion of the information requests we receive from the private sector — and we do field quite a lot of queries from asset managers and businesses leaders looking for information on SWFs — are about the Qatar Investment Authority. In fact, I’d say we get more questions about the QIA than even the CIC.

Now, I’m guessing this stems from the fact that the QIA is extremely opaque (even compared to the CIC, which has actually become increasingly transparent). Nonetheless, the widespread interest in the QIA likely reflects its status as a global investor. The QIA seems to be everywhere right now.

An Unsurprising ‘Sydney Statement’

Ashby Monk

The International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds just released its “Sidney Statement” describing the conclusions and takeaways from the 2nd Annual Meeting of the IFSWF that finished up in Sydney on Saturday.

I have to say, my predictions last week about what would feature in the Statement look to be almost spot on. Here is the Statement abstract:

“The Forum members exchanged views on the Santiago Principles (Principles), and the emerging investment outlook given the current market conditions and the ongoing regulatory policy reform agenda. Of particular importance was the opportunity to continue dialogue with recipient countries with a view to maintaining free flow of long-term investment capital. Hosted by Australia’s Future Fund, senior officials from 22 SWFs attended the meeting. Senior level representatives from 6 recipient countries, the Asian Development Bank, European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the OECD, and the World Bank also participated.”

There’s nothing too noteworthy here, in my opinion. Still, there was a seemingly innocuous tidbit near the bottom of the Statement that’s worth flagging:

“The Forum members will undertake a survey on the experiences with application of the Principles and publish relevant parts of it.”

I interpret this to mean that a serious discussion took place about the need to introduce some formal compliance metrics for the Santiago Principles. However, the prospect of formal compliance procedures inspired quite a bit of anxiety about what this could mean for SWFs deemed to be “non-compliant”. So a compromise was found: a ‘survey of experiences with application of the Principles’. To me, this is a euphemistic way of saying that the Forum will assess how far SWFs have gotten with implementation, which is good news.

While we’ll have to wait for the Beijing IFSWF meeting in April 2011 before we see the results of this survey (…if we ever see them…), I think this is a step in the right direction. In my view, compliance and implementation are crucial for the long-term success of the Principles…and the survey is the first step.

Rotman ICPM Sponsors SWF Project

Ashby Monk

Here’s a bit of good news for a Monday morning. Gordon and I have just received a new round of funding to keep the Oxford SWF Project alive for another year. It’s a gratifying development, as it means that there are at least a few people who like the work we’ve been doing over the past two years and would like to see it continue.

Specifically, these people are at The Rotman International Centre for Pension Management, which is within the University of Toronto’s Rotman School of Management. Frankly, we’re thrilled to have Rotman ICPM on board, as they have a remarkable research program that has plenty of synergies with our own. Here is some background:

“The Rotman International Centre for Pension Management (ICPM) is a research centre at the Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto. The Centre is supported by an international consortium of twenty-six major pension organizations. The mission of Rotman ICPM is to be a catalyst for improving the management of pension systems and organizations around the world. This mission is achieved through funding relevant research projects, organizing discussion forums, and publishing the Rotman International Journal of Pension Management.”

Specifically, Rotman ICPM wants us to examine the design and governance of pension reserve funds. So we’ll be doing some papers and case studies on the various funds around the world next year. In addition, we’ll continue to maintain this website. It should be a lot of fun. Three cheers for Rotman!

Weekend Reading

Ashby Monk

Jason Kotter and Ugur Lel have a very interesting new paper out entitled, “Friends or Foes? Target Selection Decisions of Sovereign Wealth Funds and Their Consequences.”

The paper uses variable SWF transparency to investigate investment strategies and target firm valuations. Here’s the premise for the paper:

“The weak legal environment and high level of corruption in many countries with a SWF can also subject target firms to the risk that SWF investments are used for the personal gain of politicians or their supporters…Overall, it is not clear whether SWFs’ investment strategies are based on financial objectives and whether they increase or reduce firm value. However, voluntary SWF transparency can be used as a signal of the likelihood that SWFs’ investment choices are financially based and that they will increase target firm value…investment objectives of SWFs and their impact on firm value are likely related to the degree of transparency and accountability of SWFs. Using voluntary SWF transparency as a proxy for the quality of screening and monitoring by SWFs, we analyze SWFs’ investment activities and their impact on target firm value in this paper.”

It is an interesting paper with some revealing conclusions:

“SWF transparency plays a major role in determining investors’ reaction to the SWF investment announcement…findings suggest that SWFs do not improve firm value in the long-run and do not influence the governance environment of target firms, implying that shareholder activism is not common among SWFs…”

Get the paper here. Have a nice weekend!

India and Venezuela To Launch Joint-SWF?

Ashby Monk

How’s this for an interesting nugget of news on your Friday morning: Venezuela wants to partner with India to set up a $100 billion SWF to jointly acquire energy assets around the world. (Cue confused facial expression).

What’s perhaps even more bizarre than Venezuela’s offer is India’s apparent interest in the idea:

“‘India has asked for a draft of the proposal. It will be discussed with concerned ministries and companies dealing in energy sector,’ said an external affairs ministry official, requesting anonymity.”

Apparently, the joint-SWF was first raised back in 2006 by President Hugo Chavez to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and the idea has taken root. In fact, the two sides are already talking through some of the details of how this might be organized:

“The fund would be set up with an initial corpus of $10 billion and scaled up over five years. To sweeten the deal and re-launch economic as well as trade relations with India, Venezuela has offered to supply an additional 100,000 barrels crude oil on daily basis at pre-determined rates irrespective of crude markets fluctuations globally.”

I’m not sure what to say about this. India and Venezuela have pretty good relations. But do they want to tie the knot over a $100 billion SWF?

Let’s think about this for a second. On the positive side, combining local knowledge about South Asia and Latin America could be a potent mix for investment returns. However, on the negative side, this joint-fund doesn’t really sound like a commercial endeavor (i.e. it’s not really looking for returns). It sounds more like an overtly strategic / geopolitical tool for picking up energy assets around the world (probably in the developing countries where national security concerns are lower).

Anyway, it’s hard for me to believe this fund will ever materialize. Still, it’s an interesting development…

Santiago Implementation Falls Short

Ashby Monk

The International Forum of SWFs kicked off its 2nd Annual meeting today in Sydney. According to the FT, the main topic of discussion will be SWFs’ interactions with foreign governments and investment regimes. This isn’t all that surprising, as difficulties in this domain are what drove the creation of the IWG and the Forum in the first place; i.e. SWFs came together to ensure that cross border investment regimes would remain open. Indeed, this was the impetus for the Santiago Principles. As an ‘unnamed SWF source’ explains in the FT today:

“That was the issue that gave rise to the whole thing…We responded by adopting the Santiago Principles and now we want to see what the rest of the world is doing about [providing] open, non-discriminatory investment markets.”

What? Hold your horses just a second, unnamed FT source. You are confusing the adoption of the Santiago Principles at the level of the IWG and the Forum with the implementation of the Principles at the level of the SWFs. The two are quite different.

While I think we’d all agree that developing and “adopting” the Principles was a remarkable feat of diplomacy and negotiation at the international level, their long-term success will depend on SWFs’ compliance with them. In other words, I don’t think you can claim to have “adopted” the Santiago Principles just because the IWG agreed on a framework. The funds themselves have to use this framework.

And, unfortunately, most aren’t. A new paper by Sven Behrendt of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace offers some important insight into the level of compliance with the Principles. Sven came up with a “Santiago Compliance Index” that, in his words, “provides a snapshot of the compliance level to the Santiago Principles across its 26 signatories as of March 2010, based on publicly available data provided exclusively by official sources.”

So, what’s the verdict?

“Some eighteen months after the publication of the Santiago Principles, their implementation is highly uneven. A small group of SWFs, predominantly from democratic countries, shows a high degree of commitment to the principles. A second group shows partial implementation, and a third group, mainly from the Gulf Arab region, has yet to reach satisfactory implementation levels…the process appears to have lost some of its earlier momentum.”

In other words, there remains quite a bit of work to be done to move from “adoption” at the level of the IWG / Forum to “compliance” at the level of the SWFs. In fact, Sven finds that there are literally zero (!) SWFs that are 100% “Santiago Compliant” – i.e. not a single SWF has managed to implement all the principles and practices that they themselves crafted and agreed to adopt. While some funds are quite close (such as the New Zealand Superannuation Fund), most fall under the 60% compliance range. Remarkably, some signatories (e.g. Iran) are literally 0% compliant.

So, while Forum members convening in Sydney today might prefer to rejoice in the “adoption” of the principles and focus the discussion on the investment regimes of target countries, it is clear (to me at least) that a discussion on “compliance” and “implementation” is still necessary…

Optimal SWF Design: Privatization?

Ashby Monk

Jamus Lim of the World Bank has a provocative article out this morning on the optimal design of SWFs. The premise for the article is to consider innovative commitment mechanisms to keep SWFs focused exclusively on their mandate. In other words, Lim wonders how SWFs can be set up to prevent politicians from raiding the funds when they see it politically useful.

Lim and I agree on this one: it’s all about governance. However, he has a pretty quirky idea on how to irrevocably discipline and tame politicians. He proposes to privatize SWFs. Yes, you read that correctly. He is talking about private SWFs. I’ll let him explain it:

“…one (admittedly risky) strategy is to provide such institutional independence by privatizing the SWF. There is a fundamental difference between a public institution that has been granted independence, versus a private institution. For one, the privatization option is far more irreversible. Raids on a privatized SWF would essentially entail the seizure of private assets followed by their nationalization; in contrast, thefts from a nominally independent SWF is mainly a matter of accounting changes made to the books of two relevant government entities…

But how would a privatized SWF be responsible to its original mandate, which is to serve as a stabilization fund for the country? Through a contractual arrangement. Just as utilities companies are obliged to continue to provide their services after they have been privatized, a privatized SWF will be obligated to fulfill their contractually-agreed mandates (whatever those may be). But being private entities, they will be generally freer from political interference…”

Kudos to Lim for raising my eyebrows this morning; I have to say I’m intrigued by the notion of privatizing a SWF to facilitate commitment to the mandate over the long-term. In a sense, this is close to (but not quite the same as) what Canada’s CPPIB has done. Still, while interesting in theory, I’m very skeptical that “privatized SWFs” will ever be roaming the world. In fact, I’m pretty sure a “private SWF” would no longer fit the definition of a SWF…

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This website is a project of Professor Gordon L. Clark and Dr. Ashby Monk of the School of Geography and the Environment at the University of Oxford. Their research on sovereign wealth funds is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and The Rotman International Centre for Pension Management.

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