Archive for June, 2010



Libya Training Finance Professionals…in London

Ashby Monk

Stephen Foley of the independent has a really interesting story this morning on the Libyan government’s backing of a new London hedge fund. This may not appear very special at first glance, but it’s actually pretty cool. The hedge fund, which is called FM Capital Partners, is conceived as a sort of “training camp” for Libyan finance professionals. Check it out:

“As well as managing money on behalf of funds linked to the Libyan government, it will also offer a training scheme for professionals from the north African state’s nascent finance industry and sovereign wealth funds.”

The hedge fund will be led by former Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns trader Frederic Marino:

“What we are developing is not just an investment fund…What we will give back to our clients is not just the returns on their investment that we generate. This is also about the transfer of investment technology and creating a generation of people who, in four or five years, will have a good level of technical international financial knowledge.”

To me, this looks like a pretty circuitous path to training the next generation of Libyans in the investment game. So what’s up? Perhaps Libya was having trouble attracting top finance professionals to Tripoli? After all, SWFs typically recruit top talent to the fund’s headquarters; I’m thinking in particular of the army of Western finance professionals living and working in the GCC countries. These individuals are integrated into the various SWFs and, as a consequence, they teach, train, and share information with the local workforce.

In this case, Libya seems to have decided that (if it can’t bring the top talent to Tripoli) it will bring the operations to London. I give them credit for being aggressive about learning. Who knows, Libya may even end up profiting from the enterprise, both in terms of human capital development and financial returns…

Kalb Says GFC Isn’t Over

Ashby Monk

Scott Kalb is the Chief Investment Officer of the Korea Investment Corporation, and he is convinced that the global financial crisis (GFC) is far from over. In fact, in this videotaped interview, he goes off on a rant about what’s still wrong with the global economy:

“Debt problems have increased and we can see the cracks and strains showing. Many people believe we’re going to have another sovereign event before the end of the year. We’ve got massive refinancing, restructuring and debt repayment. Unemployment is high. Growth is sluggish in the developed economies. Property and housing markets are unstable. We’ve got over-heating in the developing world. Taxes are going up, fiscal spending is going down…What does this tell me? The GFC is far from over…”

Ouch…

The Ultimate Governance Challenge: An Afghan SWF

Ashby Monk

To believe today’s New York Times, the United States has just found out that Afghanistan is rich. And we’re not talking ‘Alaska or Texas rich’…we’re talking ‘Qatar or Saudi rich’. Apparently, it is simply loaded with rare and valuable minerals:

“The United States has discovered nearly $1 trillion in untapped mineral deposits in Afghanistan, far beyond any previously known reserves and enough to fundamentally alter the Afghan economy…The previously unknown deposits — including huge veins of iron, copper, cobalt, gold and critical industrial metals like lithium — are so big and include so many minerals that are essential to modern industry that Afghanistan could eventually be transformed into one of the most important mining centers in the world…”

Now, there is clearly something shady about the timing of this article, but, since Afghanistan’s GDP is only about $12 billion, I’d have to agree with Gen. David H. Petraeus that this find represents “stunning potential”.

Now, I hate to be a downer, but I think everybody needs to temper their exuberance about this find. Remember, the possession of natural resources far too often leads countries to economic and political turmoil, especially in the developing world. So, at the very least, this windfall suggests to me that Afghanistan will soon be facing some very serious governance challenges. After all, how can a war-torn country beset with corruption manage to use these windfall rents for the good of the Afghan people? It’s hard to imagine, as many, many other (more stable) countries have already failed in this regard.

This means that considerable thought should go into the management of these revenues. But, unfortunately, the US government seems to be putting the cart ahead of the horse:

“The Pentagon is helping Afghan officials arrange to start seeking bids on mineral rights by next fall, officials said.”

In my opinion, the fundamental question here is not how the minerals will be priced or extracted but where the eventual revenues will go and how they will be used. Without having rigorously defined and articulated answers to the latter questions, Afghanistan could easily fall prey to the “resource curse.” And this won’t do anybody any good.

In my opinion, Afghanistan should start setting up a commodity-based SWF right now. Commodity funds are being used by countries around the world to help ensure proper management of resources revenues, including stabilization, sterilization and savings. Governments from Angola, Alabama, Alaska and Azerbaijan to PNG, Timor Leste, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela have all set up commodity based SWFs for this purpose.

The international community would be doing the Afghan people a huge service if they “helped” the Afghan government set up a commodity SWF that sequesters the windfall resources from the budget and politicians. But, as the Nigeria case illustrates, it’s not enough just to set up a SWF; success is a function of governance. So, the new fund will need rigorously defined principles and practices governing investment decisions, asset allocations, draw-downs, and much, much more.

I acknowledge that this would be the mother of all governance challenges, but it is necessary to ensure that Afghanistan’s resource windfall contributes to the country’s stability…and not its destabilization.

Beijing’s Remarkable Impatience

Ashby Monk

Despite having an astoundingly good 2009, the China Investment Corporation has had a very bad 2010 (…and who hasn’t?…). Its portfolio is apparently down 10%, which represents a net loss of $30 billion. That’s a lot, to be sure, but, the CIC is a SWF, which means it has the luxury of taking a long-term view and not panicking about short-term fluctuations in the market. Right? Well, that’s at least the theory…and it looks as though the CIC is proving the theory wrong in practice.

Indeed, Reuters has a great article this morning in which two unnamed sources with direct knowledge of the CIC’s investment strategy talk about Beijing coming down hard on the CIC to improve its short-term returns:

“Under pressure from Beijing to post better returns, China’s sovereign wealth fund has placed a greater emphasis on short-term performance this year, two sources with direct knowledge of the fund’s strategy said.”

Wait, what?! Why? Here it is directly from one of Reuters’ sources:

“They have a serious concern about portfolio performance from the perspective of less than one year, which is slightly surprising to me because I would have thought a sovereign wealth fund hiring offshore fund managers would give them 3 to 5 years to perform.”

“Slightly surprising” is euphemistic for what this is…I’m dumbfounded by this. The CIC had _an awesome_ year in 2009. Why would the central government be putting pressure on it now? I defy you to find me a large and well-diversified long only institutional investor whose portfolio is not down 10% this year.

Theoretically, the CIC is in an extremely favorable position. With no pressing liabilities, it should be using this downturn to pick up assets that have been unfairly (cheaply) priced, in particular those in illiquid markets. However, this pressure from Beijing appears to be pushing them in the opposite direction:

“…the world’s fifth largest state-run investor may prefer more liquid investments such as equities.”

So, if we are to believe this story, the CIC is being forced by China’s political leadership to give up its most important, strategic, long-term, competitive advantage — its investment time horizon — in order to generate some short-term returns.

Why? Well, I’m guessing much of this has to do with internal conflicts for resources that have been going on for (what feels like) ages. Indeed, we heard again yesterday that the internal debate about topping up the CIC with more foreign exchange reserves is not yet resolved. Maybe the State Council has told the CIC that if it wants the additional capital, it has to show the returns…and right now.

You know, despite all the theory about SWFs being the longest-term investors in the world, I routinely find myself looking at this type of counter-factual that shows how, in practice, these funds take the short-term view. As it turns out, these funds often have similar time horizons as their institutional cousins in the private sector. It appears that government shareholders can be just as impatient as their private sector counterparts…

Visualizing SWFs

Ashby Monk

Having done a degree in economic geography, I have a soft spot in my heart for maps. And this Flash map by Sven Behrendt and his team at the Carnegie Middle East Center is quite useful.

It plots the location and size of SWFs, while allowing you to roll your mouse over the funds to find out some basic information about each one of them.

It’s remarkable to see how large a handful of these funds are in comparison to the whole community of SWFs. ADIA, GPF-G and CIC dominate the landscape. Anyway, check it out.

“It is an ill wind that blows nobody any good”

Ashby Monk

I lifted the quote above from Jin Liqun’s op-ed in the China Daily today. Jin is Chairman of the CIC’s Supervisory Board and Deputy Chairman of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, and he seems to be suggesting—if I’m interpreting him correctly—that SWFs may soon be facing some new protectionist headwinds:

“…misgivings about SWFs are likely to rekindle as economies recover and the credit crunch becomes less of a problem. The mood would probably swing back. It may sound a bit weird, but it is true that SWFs’ relevance to global stability does not guarantee their status as a guest of honor in some of the economies where they have proved to be part of the solution, not part of the problem.”

Many SWF analysts and wonks have been wondering when these sentiments would resurface in the wake of the crisis. Jin’s op-ed may be a signal that protectionism is on its way.

What I found interesting about Jin’s article was his take on why the CIC has, in particular, raised concern in the West:

“Two issues seem to have ruffled feathers in the mature economies in the West. One is state ownership and the other is size. Indeed, these two issues are quite irrelevant. By definition, any SWF is state-owned. While the sovereign feature is its glaring hallmark, management is independent of ownership. SWFs have made it very clear that they have no political agendas to pursue, their mandate being to achieve satisfactory returns on their investment in the long term.”

Jin is right; these two factors do underpin much of the West’s concern about the CIC. However, I’m not sure I would discount the relevance of state ownership, as Jin does; indeed, he says that state ownership is irrelevant because the CIC’s management is independent of ownership. While he is technically correct in terms of the organization’s theoretical design, many remain unconvinced that this design accords, in practice, with true independence.

To be sure, the CIC is set up in a manner consistent with Western corporate structures. For example, there is a CEO that is responsible to a Board of Directors. There is also a Board of Supervisors with an audit committee and a supervision committee. In short, the organization appears to meet Anglo-American expectations for corporate governance.

However, as Gordon and I argued in a recent paper, the central government still manages to directly and indirectly influence CIC decision-making. We suggest that the central government is able to exert control over the CIC by virtue of the Party’s claim on the career prospects of the senior officials running the CIC (see here for more details). So, the CIC’s commitment to a Western institutional form may not represent a functional allocation of powers and responsibilities consistent with the practice in many Western investment agencies.

In other words, the CIC’s managers may not be as independent from the owners as Jin claims…but it’s next to impossible to know for sure, which is why protectionism remains a threat.

The Oil Curse: What Would Askeladden Do?

Ashby Monk

Norwegian Central Bank Governor Svein Gjedrem gave a fascinating lecture today at the Norwegian Oil Museum entitled, “Oil in the economy.” It’s well worth reading, as the Governor does a great job of linking Norwegian folklore and historical anecdotes with a series of interesting insights about Norway’s successes and failures in managing the country’s commodity windfalls. While I don’t want to give too much away, here is the Governor’s final thought:

“It is too early to draw conclusions as to how successful Norway has been in managing its oil wealth. In ten years or so, when petroleum production falls markedly and the oil fund is no longer increasing in size, the cost level in Norway will have to be reduced relative to other countries. This process may be painful, even though Norway has its own currency and a floating exchange rate. Our welfare state may also have become too large and the adjustment required here may also prove to be very demanding.”

We’re Not Selling…As Far As You Know

Ashby Monk

For the secretive bunch that they are, SWFs have been uncharacteristically vocal about their investment strategies as of late. It seems every time I pick up a newspaper, I find myself reading a story about some SWF that has decided NOT to sell this or that asset.

Apparently, SWFs are not selling their euro reserves. Nor are they selling European investments. Moreover, they are not selling their BP shares. And, in case you missed it, they’ve decided not to sell their Israeli investments. (And there are plenty of other examples.)

What gives? Why are SWFs telling the world about their current plans and policies? After all, these funds have argued against increasing transparency on the grounds that it would give away too much information about their current plans and policies and lead to front-running.

The obvious reason is that SWFs are trying to stem their losses. When the world thinks SWFs might be selling euro assets, the euro’s decline seems to accelerate. But when SWFs affirm their support for euro assets, the market seems to stabilize. This principle holds true in a variety of settings; for example, Kuwait’s comments about BP seem to be going over well this morning.

So, SWFs are being quite strategic with their communications strategy. If transparency improves returns (or stems losses), they appear to be all for it. But, believe me, if these funds were selling these assets, they’d surely keep that information to themselves.

All that being said, pundits and analysts have forced many SWFs to disclose their current thinking. There have been plenty of (unfounded) speculations about what SWFs are doing…and these speculations can move markets. As such, SWFs are forced to tell the markets what the markets want to hear to return some notion of stability. The real question, then, is whether the SWFs actually mean it when they say, ‘we’re not selling’.

Should SWFs Be Used to ‘Strengthen Ties’?

Ashby Monk

I came across quite an interesting story by Jungmin Hong this morning in Businessweek about Brazil asking Korea to direct the Korea Investment Corporation to invest in Brazilian bonds so as to strengthen bilateral ties. While Hong’s article is very short — it’s literally less than 80 words — it makes up for brevity with provocation:

“Brazil asked South Korea’s sovereign wealth fund to boost investment in real-denominated bonds to strengthen financial ties between the countries…Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega also asked his Korean counterpart, Yoon Jeung Hyun, to share its experience of managing the fund, South Korea’s Ministry of Strategy and Finance said today in an e-mailed statement.”

Now, it’s one thing to offer experience and advice on running a SWF. But it’s another thing altogether to ask a country’s political leadership to direct their SWF to invest in your country in order to ‘strengthen ties’. Unfortunately, Hong seems to have forgotten the punch line. So, we’re left wondering whether the Korean government ever did direct the KIC to invest in Brazil’s bonds.

My assumption is that it did not. The KIC is a highly transparent SWF and a signatory of the Santiago Principles. Remember, GAPP Principle 19 says that SWFs’ investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns only. In other words, investments should focus only on economic and financial benefits. In my view, the Brazilian request falls beyond these criteria and lands somewhere in the geopolitical realm.

By the way, Brazil should know better than to ask a country to use their SWF in this manner, as it participated in the International Working Group that developed the Santiago Principles as one of the “Recipient Country Representatives”.

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This website is a project of Professor Gordon L. Clark and Dr. Ashby Monk of the School of Geography and the Environment at the University of Oxford. Their research on sovereign wealth funds is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and The Rotman International Centre for Pension Management.

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