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Santiago Principles Vs. Truman Scoreboard

Published July 19, 2010 Uncategorized 7 Comments
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Ashby Monk

Back in 2007, SWFs found themselves under the intense glare of the international community, which was due in large part to some high-profile investments in Western financial services firms at the outset of the financial crisis (e.g. Citigroup) and the creation of some new, large SWFs (e.g. China Investment Corporation). And because few people knew much, if anything, about SWFs, this raised questions about their motives and operations and sparked the beginnings of protectionist rhetoric.

On cue, Edwin Truman of the Peterson Institute launched his now famous Scoreboard that ranked SWFs’ structure, governance, accountability, transparency and behavior. And, unfortunately for the funds, the results weren’t very flattering. In fact, that’s putting it mildly, as some of the biggest funds in the world, such as the GIC and ADIA, scored embarrassingly low (2.25 and 0.5, respectively, out of a possible 25).

Truman’s scoreboard seemingly catapulted him to the pulpit of what became a sort of ‘reform movement’ for SWFs. Indeed, facilitated by the IMF, the world’s biggest SWFs subsequently came together in the International Working Group of SWFs to consider how their operations could be improved to align them with international expectations. The outcome of these deliberations was the Santiago Principles, comprised of a series of (voluntary) principles and practices that amounted to a “best practice” mantra for SWF management, governance and design.

And now, he’s baaaack. And Truman’s new message isn’t going to comfort SWFs any more than his original one: he is apparently arguing that the Santiago Principles fall well short of international standards of best practice, as he defines them. At a recent conference on SWFs organized by Forrest Research (click here for an agenda and a link to Truman’s presentation), he said that a fund that achieves 100% compliance with the Santiago Principles (which, by the way, no fund has achieved) would represent only 76% compliance with his Scoreboard:

“This implies that full performance on the GAPP [Santiago Principles] would put an SWF near the top of the middle group on the SWF Scoreboard…The biggest weaknesses are with respect to accountability and associated transparency.”

But it’s not all bad; Truman seems to agree with a point that I made a few months back: the Santiago Principles may be weak and toothless, but they have actually been effective:

“…weak principles are more easily adopted, which is why we have seen so many SWFs attempt to become GAPP-compliant. In that sense, perhaps this was the right “starting point” for SWFs’ process of opening up; baby steps.”

I still believe that. And the increases in transparency at funds such as the GIC and ADIA seem to give further credence to this argument.

But, as Truman concludes, one of the big tests going forward will be whether the Santiago Principles can be improved and actually implemented. I agree that implementation is key here, and shouldn’t be too onerous. After all, we’re just asking the funds to implement the framework that they themselves came up with (remember that some of funds, such as Iran’s, are 0% compliant with the Principles…seriously). Why is this important, you ask? Why are the SWFs being singled out? I don’t have an easy answer to that. All I know is that the Santiago Principles were designed to guard against financial protectionism, and I think many would agree that open investing is in everyone’s interest.

Prediction: SWF to Win Yellow Jersey

Published July 16, 2010 Uncategorized 5 Comments
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Ashby Monk

I’m a huge cycling fan. When I was younger (and thinner), I raced as an amateur around Europe and even had hopes of one day joining the professional peloton. But, alas, genetic inferiority eventually caught up with me, and I wound up becoming a professional student instead.

Nonetheless, I’ve been captivated by this year’s Tour de France. And, with the Tour entering its third and final week, I can’t resist making a bold prediction about the eventual winner. And here it is: I predict this year’s winner will be…wait for it…a sovereign wealth fund.

Wait, what? Yes, you read that correctly. I predict that a SWF will be on the highest podium when the peloton reaches Paris on July 25th. How is that possible, you ask? Well, remember that professional cycling is comprised of teams that are named to reflect their corporate sponsorship. So, for example, some of the teams at this year’s Tour de France include, AG2R, Garmin-Transitions, Team RadioShack, and Team Sky.

So, I’m predicting that the winner of this year’s tour will be Alberto Contador (which, if I’m honest, isn’t all that bold a prediction, as he won last year as well). And, as it happens, Contador is riding for Team Astana, which, since late 2009, has been financed by Kazakhstan’s SWF: the National Welfare Fund Samruk-Kazyna.

That’s right. Riding in this year’s TDF is a SWF-financed professional cycling team. Samruk-Kazyna stepped in with the $22 million needed to finance the operations of Team Astana when money was tight back in 2009. And just like that, a SWF joined the professional peloton.

In case you’re curious, nowhere in the SWF’s mandate is there anything about cycling let alone sport. And, let’s be honest, sponsoring a cycling team cannot really be called an investment; it’s marketing (e.g. think about the masses of Americans that still ride around in their US Postal Service jerseys).

Originally, the plan was to change the name of the team to reflect the new sponsorship. But, the SWF really had no need for “marketing”, so the Astana brand – which is named after the Kazakh capital city – was maintained. Still, while the SWF opted not to change the team name, the SWF’s logo is featured quite prominently on the shoulders, sides and rear of all of the Astana riders at this year’s TDF (see Contador in action below).

I have to say, I’m fascinated by all of this – as you can probably tell – it brings together my passion for cycling with my interest in SWFs. But I’m still scratching my head on this one. Why on earth would any SWF want to sponsor a pro bike team? Let’s see if we can come up with an explanation:

1) The SWF’s head Kayrat Kelimbetov is president of the Cycling Federation of Kazakhstan. So, he is clearly a fan of cycling and probably takes personal enjoyment from seeing his country’s team atop the podium at La Grande Boucle. In short, the funding could be more about personal enjoyment than anything related to the SWF’s operations.

2) One of Kazakhstan’s Ministers explained the decision to fund the team as follows:

“The team has to be maintained; it’s the prestige of our state.”

Given that the team was initially created as a vehicle to showcase a remarkable Kazakh cycling talent (Alexandre Vinokourov) and to create positive PR for Kazakhstan, this isn’t all that surprising a motivation.

3) There is also an official explanation for why a SWF would sponsor a cycling team:

“Today, our multinational and multi-confessional country is an initiator and active participant of the integration processes in Central Asia and Eurasia. Along with loyalty to its own national values and long history, Kazakhstan expresses its commitment to the universal principles of democracy. That is why the success of the “Astana” cycling team is so important for us. We hope the season that is coming up will be very successful, both in sports and in politics…We trust that “Astana” will become both a sports and ethical model, which will help to bring up a new generation of racing cyclists around the world and in Kazakhstan. There are already 13 Kazakhstani racers, young, promising athletes in the composition of the new team. We believe that, in the future, many of them will become stars of the cycling world. We know that the victories of “Astana” inspire young Kazakhstani athletes, support the development of cycling in Kazakhstan and we hope that within two-three years, the regular Pro-Tour will be held in the Motherland of the “Astana” team – the Republic of Kazakhstan.”

I’m not sure I followed the first half of that explanation, but the second half is more straightforward: the SWF seems to be nurturing a future generation of Kazakh cyclists.

In short, it’s clear to me that this sponsorship is all about the prestige of Kazakhstan and its cyclists and has little if anything to do with any commercial or financial objectives of the SWF. It’s perhaps not a case study in how to be a good steward of the public purse, but I’m quite sure the entire country of Kazakhstan is glued to their TVs this July. And so maybe it’s worth it.

Canada: Oil Sands, SWFs, and Spies

Published July 15, 2010 Uncategorized 2 Comments
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Ashby Monk

Is it any wonder that Canada has become the board upon which the global superpowers are playing out their resource chess game? The country has 175 billion barrels of oil in the ground. How big is that? BIG! To put it in perspective, it makes Canada second only to Saudi Arabia in proven oil reserves.

Naturally, this has attracted the attention of resource starved countries, such as China, whose rapid push into Canada’s oil sands has raised eyebrows:

“…recent Chinese firms’ billion-dollar incursions into the Alberta oil sands have turned many heads. Last year close to $2 billion was spent for a stake in Athabasca Oil Sands Corp projects, while this year nearly $5 billion was spent for a stake in Syncrude Canada in April and $1 billion into Penn West in May.”

By outward appearances, the Canadians seem OK with this Chinese attention. In fact, Prime Minister Stephen Harper was recently quoted as saying:

“Expect more Chinese investment in the resource and energy sectors…there will definitely be more.”

But, internally, Canada may be a bit more circumspect. Back in 2008, Foreign Affairs Canada prepared a briefing document that specifically warned that the SWFs of Russia, China, Singapore and the Gulf States operated according to suspect motives. The report apparently said:

“Sovereign funds will continue to seek to acquire resource assets both for their profitability and in order to secure their country’s access to these commodities…Over time this will require Canada to fully develop an investment policy with respect to sovereign funds. The difficulty for Canada is that we have given up the levers of sovereignty in a western market economy model while most of the emerging powers are going in another direction.”

Obviously, FA could have been over-reacting to SWFs’ interest in Canada, as there are plenty of commercial justifications for investing in Canada right now.

Nonetheless, the ongoing interest and remarkable access of some SWFs to ‘strategic assets’ has taken on new levels of political intrigue. In fact, some (such as this newspaper editorial) suggest that SWFs’ freedom to operate in Canada may stem from “agents of influence” within Canadian provincial governments:

“When governments must decide on allowing sales of resource companies to sovereign wealth funds, a friendly voice at the cabinet table can be precious.”

Outlandish? Maybe not. In case you missed it, Richard Fadden, who is the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, accused some of Canada’s policymakers of being under the influence of foreign powers (an accusation that sparked outrage across Canada). And David Harris, who is the former chief of strategic planning for CSIS, recently called China’s influence operations in Canada as being:

“…a multi-level manipulation of the democratic polity and its governors.”

Those are some pretty strong words from some highly respected intel operators that, at the very least, paint a picture of an aggressive China in Canada. So, can we conclude that China is wielding the full arsenal of its state apparatus – from its SWF all the way to its spies – to secure Canadian resources? How would I know? But it’s fun to pose the question…

Aabar Retreats to the Shadows

Published July 13, 2010 Uncategorized Leave a Comment
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Ashby Monk

While the number of SWFs looking to the financial markets for capital has been growing, one fund has decided to go the opposite route: Aabar Investments has officially announced its plans to de-list and go private. In large part, this decision has been driven by the International Petroleum Investment Company, which owns 72% of Aabar and intends to buy out the minority shareholders (at a discount, it should be noted).

I have to say that I find it quite ironic to talk about a “private” Aabar, as taking the fund private actually implies it would be 100% publicly held (i.e. by the government), while the “public” Aabar that exists today has private shareholders. Confused yet?

Anyway, Aabar was always a strange case among Abu Dhabi’s publicly owned investors. It was a traded private equity fund, but it had a single SWF as its majority shareholder. Also, while some of my contacts think of it as a “company”, it has increasingly become more of an “investment fund”. Indeed, it was launched in 2005 as Aabar Petroleum but later changed its name to Aabar Investments.

As such, it’s reasonable to say that Aabar was a bit schizophrenic; not just for the reasons above but because it had to meet the interests of its private sector shareholders (who were interested exclusively in returns over the short- to medium-term), all the while pleasing its single public shareholder (which probably has broader aspirations for Aabar beyond short-term financial results, such as facilitating economic development in the Emirate). It’s for this reason that IPIC likely stepped in, which is all the more understandable given that Aabar’s profile has been increasing over the past few years.

And most of the analysis I’ve read over the past few days fits with this interpretation. Indeed, the general consensus seems to be that Aabar (and IPIC) were looking for some additional “room to maneuver”, which is a euphemism for less transparency and public accountability. A wholly government owned Aabar would not have to answer to any minority shareholders nor would it have to make public disclosures, as it does now. Instead, it would only have to please one shareholder: IPIC.

And so, Aabar will join its SWF brethren in the UAE and move into the shadows. While I’m of the opinion that it could still benefit from transparent operations, I’m actually sympathetic to this move; Aabar is finally resolving its identity crisis. Indeed, this should end the debate about whether we should consider Aabar an SWF or not —  a government owned and controlled investment fund can’t really be called much else, in my opinion.

Beyond SWFs: Getting Creative with Reserve Diversification

Published July 12, 2010 Uncategorized Leave a Comment
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Ashby Monk

Don’t miss this fantastic E-Report on the future of the global reserve system that was put together by the Asian Development Bank and Columbia’s Earth Institute. It’s a remarkable collection of scholarly papers that will undoubtedly become a key reference for policymakers. All 18 papers are worth reading, but I’d like to draw your attention to one in particular: Donghyun Park and Andrew Rozanov’s work entitled, “Asia’s Sovereign Wealth Funds and Reform of the Global Reserve System.”

Park and Rozanov’s primary thesis (if I’m interpreting them correctly) is that Asia’s reserve hoarders must re-distribute their sovereign wealth away from central bankers (and their dollar-denominated government bonds) towards institutional investors better suited to portfolio diversification. Why? Because they see diversification as a crucial stepping stone to a successful reform of the current reserve system:

“This profound shift in the management of excess foreign exchange reserves in Asia would be completely in line with the widely held view on what needs to happen for global macroeconomic rebalancing to occur: Asia needs to stop the flow of uneconomically cheap financing for its main trading partners by switching to domestic and regional investment and consumption and by introducing greater exchange rate flexibility, while the United States needs to cut back on borrowing and consumption by increasing its national saving rate.”

Fair enough. But this then begs the question as to how these countries should do this. The obvious answer is to set up a SWF, which the authors acknowledge. But, then, what should countries without SWFs do? Park and Rozanov have some creative ideas. And here is one of them:

“If the principal stakeholders in a reserve-rich Asian nation do not have the political will, the risk appetite and the necessary consensus to set up a sovereign wealth fund to manage a large portion of national savings with a long-term return objective, then they might want to consider restructuring and transferring some of the excess reserves into the national pension fund, which may be a politically more palatable and viable vehicle for such long-term wealth management. In this scenario, the transfer of excess foreign exchange reserves into the pension fund would be matched by a counter-transfer of local government bonds and cash of equivalent value to the local monetary authorities, who would then be able to shrink their balance sheet by the same amount.”

I’m particularly interested in this idea of using forex reserves to bolster national pensions. In large part, this stems from the fact that I was a pension wonk long before I was a SWF wonk. So the idea manages to scratch two of my nerdy itches at once. Kidding aside, the idea at the very least has merit on the grounds that it will help countries better manage the risks of an ageing population (most countries aren’t on top of this, in my opinion). But Park and Rozanov are making their case for the pension vehicle in a slightly different way: they see an opportunity to alleviate the reserve burden on monetary authorities, all the while improving the investment performance of the pension funds:

“This would help local monetary authorities, who are reluctant holders of reserves in the first place, to shrink their balance sheets, while at the same time helping national pension reserve funds expand their allocations to foreign assets in one fell swoop, without the associated market impact.”

It’s a thought-provoking idea with some potentially important welfare implications. Moreover, given that the reserve hoarding countries ultimately discount the value of their human resources by keeping their currencies artificially low, I think it only fitting that the governments return some of this wealth back to the people through old age benefits and disability.

Weekend Reading

Published July 10, 2010 Uncategorized Leave a Comment
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Ashby Monk

Hélène Raymond of the Université de Paris X has a new paper out entitled “Sovereign Wealth Funds as domestic investors of last resort during crises.” In the paper, Raymond extends the work that Gordon and I did in 2009 on SWFs acting as ‘investors of last resort’. It’s worth a read. Here is a brief excerpt:

“At first sight a Sovereign Wealth Fund does not seem fit to play the part of the lender of last resort or to be used as an insurance fund during crises. Contrary to Central Banks and Foreign Exchange Reserves funds, SWFs invest in the long run. Their long term illiquid assets might be difficult to cash in during crises: they are not tailored to react quickly in case of bank runs or foreign capital outflows. But when there is a worldwide systemic crisis of the magnitude of the turmoil experienced after September 2008, the Central Bank’s intervention is not enough to restore liquidity.”

Raymond also unearths some interventions by SWFs in domestic economies that I wasn’t aware of. Anyway, get it here.

Rethinking the ‘W’ in ‘SWF’

Published July 9, 2010 Uncategorized 6 Comments
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Ashby Monk

I’ve had the following question nagging at me for almost year now: If a sovereign wealth fund is financed by something other than sovereign wealth, should we still think of it as a sovereign wealth fund?

My interest in this topic stems from the fact that a growing number of SWFs are looking to the private sector for capital. And I’m not just talking about Mubadala or Mumtalakat – there are a bunch of SWFs that are going this route:

  • I noted yesterday that Temasek was exploring ways to bring private investors into their operations through its new SeaTown venture.
  • The GIC is also considering a $2 billion IPO of GIC Real Estate.
  • Qatari Diar – a subsidiary of the Qatar Investment Authority – is looking to issue $3.5 billion in debt.
  • Central Huijin, a subsidiary of the China Investment Corporation, is about to launch a big debt offering.
  • And, finally, news came out this morning that Kazakhstan’s Samruk-Kazyna is looking to issue debt in the short term and potentially take the SWF public through an IPO in the long-run.

Clearly, raising cash from the private sector is increasingly popular among SWFs. So, back to my original question, should we still view these entities as SWFs if they are managing private money? I’m not so sure, and here’s why:

1) Liabilities: Back in 2007-08, those of us that were researching SWFs expended considerable effort trying to define the term ‘sovereign wealth fund‘. In addition, the SWFs themselves made an attempt at defining which funds were and were not within their community. In short, the common thread among SWFs was their liability profile — or rather their lack thereof — they have no liabilities (at least beyond the sponsoring government). In other words, if a SWF owes money to anybody, it owes it back to the government that set it up. Why is this important? Well, if a SWF issues debt to the private sector, its liability profile now includes non-governmental creditors.

2) Investment strategy. The liability profile of SWFs affords them a strategic advantage, as they have perhaps the longest time horizon among all institutional investors (although it is debatable whether all governments actually afford their SWFs this duration in practice). Now, if a SWF is taking in private money, then the investment strategy of the fund is going to have to shift, albeit slightly, towards investments that pay-off in a time-frame that meets private sector interests.

As such, the core characteristics of these funds are altered by accepting to manage private capital. This raises the question as to why they would want to do this. Again, I have some thoughts:

1) Cash poor. Undoubtedly, the rise in SWFs’ interest in private money is due to the fact that some SWFs found themselves over-committed during the financial crisis. In short, salvaging certain projects necessitated a turn to the private sector for additional financing.

2) Risk Seeking. Some SWFs have sought to use their solid credit rating – which they garnered on the back of their state sponsor’s rating – to issue cheap debt and then invest it in the market in riskier assets that generate higher returns. The economic principles that underpin this type of strategy are similar to those that underpin pension obligation bonds (POBs) in the United States. In my view, it’s overly risky behavior for governments.

3) International Legitimacy. If a SWF can attract private investors, then it is demonstrating to the world that it is purely commercial and financially oriented (because that’s all private investors care about). In turn, investment receiving countries will perceive them as non-threatening, which means that access to their markets will be assured.

4) Domestic Legitimacy. The big losses incurred by SWFs during the financial crisis caused plenty of problems at home for certain SWFs. One way to avoid this domestic criticism is to illustrate that private sector investors  made similar investments, i.e. the SWF’s investment strategy is blessed by the private sector, which carries weight with domestic audiences.

5) A Myth. This final point is an acknowledgement on my part that many governments demand their SWFs make returns over short- to medium-term time horizons. Indeed, despite all the theory about SWFs being the longest-term investors in the world, I routinely find myself looking at counter examples that show how, in practice, these funds take the short-term view. As such, it is reasonable to say that some funds may not be giving up much by bringing private investors into their pool of capital.

In sum, I think we need to rethink the W in SWF. The evidence suggests that, over time, this may grow to include private as well as public capital.

SeaTown: Private Sector Endorsed Public Investments?

Published July 8, 2010 Uncategorized 1 Comment
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Ashby Monk

Back in February, I noted that Temasek may be launching an innovative investment vehicle that would act as a sort of ‘externally managed sovereign hedge fund’. With a tentative name of  SeaTown (which is English for Temasek) and Charles Ong at its helm, the new ‘SHF’ was purportedly going to be wholly owned by Temasek and invest in a diverse range of assets and geographies. But at the time that was all just speculation, as Temasek was keeping pretty mum about the whole thing.

Well no more — Temasek’s 2010 Annual Report has a few more details about its SeaTown venture:

“We established SeaTown Holdings, a wholly-owned global investment company, with committed capital of over S$4 billion. SeaTown operates and makes its investment decisions independently, with reciprocal co-investment rights between Temasek and SeaTown. SeaTown is intended as a co-investment platform for sophisticated investors in the medium term.”

Temasek’s Executive Director Simon Israel also discussed the new entity at a press conference. Apparently, the idea was to create an entity that invests both public money (i.e. Temasek’s money) and, eventually, private sector money:

“SeaTown is a test bed, if you will, to explore how this can be done in a sensible and sustainable manner.”

In short, the plan is to invite private institutional investors to co-invest in SeaTown in roughly 3-5 years’ time, with retail investment potentially available in a decade or so.

All in all, I think this is a pretty fascinating development, but it still begs a fundamental question: Why did Temasek go to the trouble of setting up an external institutional investor to invest in stocks and bonds when most people (at least in the West) probably think that this is exactly what Temasek is already doing?

I see a variety of possibilities, of which I’ll address just one: Temasek may be trying to dodge the SWF stigma. As Jan Randolph of IHS Global Insight argued today:

“In some ways [Temasek] wants to dilute its sovereign wealth fund-type genetic identity by managing private funds.”

In other words, if you are predisposed to think that Temasek is scary just because it’s a SWF, then the hope may be that you won’t be afraid of SeaTown — the independent, private and commercial ‘SHF’ that manages public and private money. In this manner, Temasek may want to have their investment strategies “blessed” by private and commercial investors to ensure that international and domestic audiences grant them legitimacy. It’s an interesting strategy.

India’s Overtly Political SWF

Published July 7, 2010 Uncategorized 6 Comments
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Ashby Monk

I think it’s fair to say that the international community has concluded that SWFs must swear off strategic investments that prioritize a country’s national or geopolitical interests over financial returns. After all, the International Working Group of SWFs and the Santiago Principles had as one of their “guiding purposes” to:

“…ensure SWFs invest on the basis of economic and financial risk and return-related considerations…”

In other words, if SWFs want to secure international legitimacy, they need to convince the world that their motives are entirely commercial and financial.

Clearly, Indian policymakers didn’t get the memo; Bloomberg has an article out today that quotes an Indian policymaker talking about how he’d like to use the country’s planned SWF:

“[India] may use a proposed sovereign fund to buy mines overseas that could produce the equivalent of 8 percent of domestic output in 2017…It is critical also because we are competing with China for energy assets.”

It should be noted that this is not a one-off pronouncement by a rogue policymaker in the coal ministry. Rather, this is one of a series of comments — such as these by the country’s oil ministry — that suggest that India’s primary focus for its planned SWF is in fact political and strategic. In a way, India seems to be turning the notion of a “commodity fund” on its head; instead of using a SWF to stabilize commodity revenues, India wants a SWF to secure commodities.

Anyway, it seems that Indians view this politicized SWF as a way to compete with China for the world’s natural resources. (And it should be noted that China has been very creative in using its foreign exchange reserves to secure resources.) Still, in the case of China, the CIC seems to understand that it must (at the very least) present the outward appearance of a commercially oriented SWF (no matter its real motivations). Otherwise, the investment receiving countries might be inclined to constrain the fund’s access to their markets.

For example, CIC’s Lou Jiwei has gone to great lengths to convince the world that his SWF is not carrying out China’s national strategy or attempting to secure strategic resources. He has said: “What national strategy? Our strategy is long-term risk-adjusted returns…” and he has argued “…I don’t care about how many tons of oil to ship home, I care about whether stocks are worth more money…”

While we could debate at length the veracity of Jiwei’s claims, the point is that the CIC at least tries to appear non-political, which is what the West wants from the world’s SWFs. It seems India could learn something from China, lest their planned SWF fall prey to a protectionist backlash from investment receiving countries.

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This website is a project of Professor Gordon L. Clark and Dr. Ashby Monk of the School of Geography and the Environment at the University of Oxford. Their research on sovereign wealth funds is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and The Rotman International Centre for Pension Management.

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