Posts Tagged 'Kiribati'

Who Deserves Credit for the Big SWF Idea?

Ashby Monk

If you follow me on Twitter, you’ll know that I’ve been playing some SWF word association games. Well I’ve got another one for you: If I say, ‘governments that kicked off the SWF era’ or, how about, ‘governments that deserve credit for the big SWF idea’, what would you say?

At first blush, I’d expect you to come out with “Kuwait” or “Abu Dhabi” or “Singapore” or (if you’re really good) even “Kiribati”. But I can pretty much guarantee that you wouldn’t say, “the UK” or “USA”. After all, SWFs aren’t Western, right? In fact, they represent challenges to Western hegemony, don’t they? They’re products of emerging market imbalances, aren’t they?

Well, maybe I’m late to the party here, but I think credit for the ‘big SWF idea’ actually resides with…the UK and the US. I know that seems odd and runs counter to our current notions about SWFs. But let me — a self-proclaimed history dimwit — give you a history lesson (or at least try to).

It’s widely noted (and accepted) that Kuwait was the first country, in 1953, to set up a SWF. In this case, the acclaim for this remarkable decision is often given to the forward thinking ruler of Kuwait at the time, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah. In his wisdom, he apparently decided that the money should be set aside for the long-term welfare of the people of Kuwait. And I don’t doubt that. Rather, I’d simply note that this SWF, which was known at the time as the Kuwait Investment Board, was established eight years before the country attained independence from the UK. And, moreover, the fund was set up in London. So, at the very minimum, we can assume that the Brits had some influence over this decision (and may in fact have had the ‘big SWF idea’).

The second country to set up a SWF, in 1956, is widely accepted to be Kiribati. In this case, a fund was set up for phosphate mining revenue. The history buffs among you will recognize that Kiribati was still under British rule at the time (until 1971 actually). And it is known that the British administration was behind the levy on phosphate exports that ultimately led to the Kirabati Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund. So, once again, the Brits were there at the beginning.

Now things start to get really interesting. Any guess as to what the third country was to set up a SWF in 1958? To be fair, that’s sort of a trick question, as it was sponsored by a sub-national government: the US state of New Mexico and the State Investment Council. And do you know who set up the fourth SWF in 1974? The US State of Wyoming and the Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund. And North America wasn’t done yet, as the next two SWFs to pop up were in Alaska and Alberta in 1976. In short, the Brit’s Anglo-American cousins in North America also played an important role in legitimizing SWFs in these early years.

Now, it’s true that Singapore set up Temasek in 1974, but, at the time, it was really just a holding company and not technically an international portfolio investor. (And, by the way, Singapore was also a British Colony until 1961, so there was probably some remaining British influence.) It’s also true that the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority was established in 1976, but, there again, it’s probably reasonable to suggest the Brits had some influence in that decision (as the UAE had a ‘special treaty’ with the UK until 1971).

All that being said, I don’t want to give the Brits too much credit here. After all, they didn’t bother to set up a SWF of their own when oil revenues came pouring in from the North Sea! (A decision that still irks Scotland something fierce). To be sure, this would be a very welcome pool of cash today.

I guess I just find it interesting that the first SWFs were set up under the purview of British and American governments. Over time, the West has come to see SWFs as “foreign” and “non-Western”. And yet, they were ultimately British and American creations; the idea and their legitimacy actually came from the West!

And, the more I think about it, the more it makes sense. Both countries were already home to global financial centers (New York and London) thanks to the financial capital flowing out of pre-funded pensions and into asset managers’ coffers. Let’s also not forget that Markowitz unveiled Modern Portfolio Theory in a 1952 Journal of Finance article. As such, these countries were clearly in a ‘financial state of mind’, which means it wouldn’t have been too far a leap for these governments to see an opportunity to use financial markets in innovative ways. Enter the SWF.

Papua New Guinea: Lessons Learned

Ashby Monk

Papua New Guinea has the dubious distinction of having been the sponsor of a failed SWF: the Mineral Resource Stabilisation Fund. Originated in 1974 to hold the proceeds of a the Panguna Copper Mine – and later expanded to include all tax, royalty and dividend payments from major mining and oil projects in the country – the MRSF proved to be poorly designed and governed for its mission and, ultimately, it was shut down in 1999 due to excess draw-downs.

Today, this failure offers PNG some unique insights as it contemplates its looming LNG bounty and will clearly affect its new plans for LNG revenues. And, perhaps surprisingly, PNG has once again decided that a SWF is the way to go with its new resource strategy.

On cue, the country’s National Research Institute has just published  a new report by Peter Johnson that lays out how the country can overcome the resource curse (and its past SWF failure) by setting up a well-designed SWF. (There is also a nice interview available on Radio Australia that details some of the report’s findings.)  Specifically, Johnson examines the cases where SWFs have (and have not) worked in order to tease out lessons for PNG. As he says in his radio interview, his intention was to take some of the best international examples and adapt them to PNG’s unique “flavor and focus”, all the while avoiding the mistakes made by countries (including his own) that have had SWF flops. So, for example, he writes about the failure of the MRSF, describing its main problem as follows:

“A lack of sound governance and poor service delivery ultimately led to the fund being mismanaged and wasted.”

In addition, Johnson examined the Timor Leste Wealth Fund, the Kiribati Revenue Equalisation Fund, and the Alaska Permanent Fund for insights on developing a new fund specifically for PNG.

On a broader note, it’s become standard practice for potential SWF sponsors, such as PNG, to reach out to other countries that already have SWFs in order to learn from their experience. For example, Natsuko Waki of Reuters has a nice article this morning that describes how Angola, Ghana and Nigeria have looked to Asia and the ME for SWF inspiration:

“…they are also increasingly looking at developing Asian and Gulf nations, where funds are often managed in an opaque but strategically efficient manner, which may suit Africa better.”

But, as Natsuko notes, there is no simple “cut and paste” model for these funds. And, in the case of PNG, Johnson seems to get it, which is why he has come up with a list of specific objectives and constraints that any new PNG SWF will need to achieve:

  • “broadening PNGs economic base to avoid the destabilising effects of future commodity price shocks;
  • stabilising the macro-economic environment through investing revenues offshore;
  • creating a political will for institutional reforms to substantially improve policy development, monitoring and auditing of government expenditure;
  • integrating resource revenues into the Budget framework;
  • creating a sense of ownership by the people of PNG;
  • following the design of the Sovereign Wealth Fund on the SWF Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (Santiago Principles);
  • creating a clear purpose and objective for how the revenue is to be used; and
  • maximising the financial returns subject to appropriate risk.”

That all seems pretty straightforward and sensible (if ambitious). So, the real question then is how a new SWF can achieve all this. And this is where things get interesting: apparently Johnson doesn’t think that a single SWF can do all of the above – which is why he thinks PNG will need two separate SWFs. Here’s his logic:

“The first fund (the Future Fund) will have a long-term savings objective and the second fund (a stabilisation fund) will have a macro-economic stabilisation objective. The first fund imposes a great degree of restraint on expenditure, while the second fund allows for a high degree of expenditure flexibility. The funds can be used for development expenditure while at the same time contributing to macro-economic stabilisation.”

Johnson suggests that SWFs shouldn’t try to do too much, lest they fail at all of it. Instead, he argues that SWFs should have well-defined mandates that don’t allow for too much flexibility in decision-making. And, I have to say, I agree. And before you throw up your hands at the idea of two SWFs in one country, consider that the State of Oklahoma has managed to justify to its voters having two SWFs. So why not PNG? Perhaps two SWFs will succeed where one has already failed…

Get to know Nauru

Ashby Monk

Did you know that the Republic of Nauru has a SWF? Actually, perhaps this is a more appropriate question: Have you ever heard of the Republic of Nauru? Chances are that the world’s smallest independent republic—an Island Nation in Microneasia—has not come to your attention. Still, Nauru has some great lessons for countries considering a SWF. Why? Because it appears to have unsuccessfully used a SWF to manage its resource rents. Indeed, the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust, which was established in 1968, has been almost entirely exhausted (i.e. squandered) due to poor governance and mismanagement of funds.

From a research perspective, this is a golden opportunity, one that Martin Gould of Australia’s Treasury has not missed. He has a new research paper that uses the Nauru fund—and those of Kiribati, Timor-Leste and PNG—to outline some important lessons on how to ensure that SWFs achieve their objectives. As Gould notes:

“A key challenge for developing countries endowed with natural resources is to transform those resources into sustained improvements in living standards. A number of Pacific island countries have utilised sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) to manage government revenue from exhaustible natural resources with the aim of improving development outcomes. Experience in the region has been mixed — some SWFs have aided intergenerational equity and macroeconomic stability while others have struggled to bring about improvements in wellbeing.”

I like this paper, as it draws some really useful lessons from the experiences of these Island nations. Here are Gould’s take-aways:

  • If you have a high debt burden and a high borrowing cost, you should use your sovereign wealth to retire debt NOT set up a SWF. The chances of making returns within the SWF sufficient to justify not retiring debt are low (and the investment risks required to do so are high).
  • All SWFs need a clear objective and mandate, with strict withdrawal guidelines and borrowing rules.
  • The SWF should be integrated into the broader budget process.
  • SWF assets should (in most cases) be held off-shore. This will mitigate Dutch Disease and increase the number of investment options.
  • SWFs must be designed and governed according to international best-practice. For example, it needs professional investment management. And transparency around the operations of the SWF is vital.

I think these are all eminently sensible. And given that Gould draws these insights from successful and unsuccessful case studies, I think the advice is that much more powerful. In short, if you sponsor a SWF, you should spend some time getting to know Nauru and it’s failed attempt to manage commodity wealth through a SWF.


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This website is a project of Professor Gordon L. Clark and Dr. Ashby Monk of the School of Geography and the Environment at the University of Oxford. Their research on sovereign wealth funds is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and The Rotman International Centre for Pension Management.

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