Posts Tagged 'Modern Portfolio Theory'

Drawing Inspiration from Islamic Constraints

Ashby Monk

There is a growing frustration with the traditional theories of finance among institutional investors. For example, at the Institutional Investor Roundtable I attended in Singapore last week, only ~15 of the 71 sovereigns and pensions in the room said they viewed MPT as offering valuable tools for portfolio construction and asset allocation. Moreover, 35 of these funds indicated that they were already operating according to ‘post-modern portfolio theory’ principles. I think that’s fascinating, but what does P-MPT actually look like?

Given that I’m also coming off a week in Malaysia — which is the global hub of Islamic finance — I can’t help but reflect on some of the lessons that this niche market may offer the mainstream. Why? Because there are some really innovative things happening these days in Islamic finance. (And for those of you that think Islamic finance is not worth paying attention to, consider this: Goldman Sachs, in October, registered a $2 billion Islamic bond program → pay attention.)

Anyway, as you are no doubt aware, Islamic finance imposes some pretty serious constraints on its denizens. For example, there’s a ban on excessive speculation. There’s a ban on leverage. There’s a ban on selling things you don’t own. There’s a ban on charging interest. There’s a ban on investing in firms that rely on interest revenue or that carry a lot of debt. There’s the requirement that income must be derived as profits from shared business risk. And so on. On the surface, then, you’d expect Islamic finance to be severely constrained. And, you’d be right. But I’d argue that these constraints may offer opportunities for mainstream finance.

In the world of intellectual property, the workarounds that people come up with to avoid infringing a patent are sometimes more sophisticated and valuable than the originally patented concept. So, my thinking goes, perhaps the constraints imposed on Islamic financiers will lead to creative innovations and products that ultimately improve finance generally. Why? Because the constraints listed above actually sound reasonable. And, moreover, since Islamic finance is firmly rooted in capitalism (i.e., the profit motive and private ownership remain firmly intact), these constraints (and their workarounds) are compatible with non-Islamic finance as well.

Now, I’m not saying all investors should avoid pork products or sell their alcohol stocks. I’m also not arguing for a return to “simple finance”. (Note: There are, today, Islamic hedge funds, Islamic derivatives traders and even Islamic mechanisms to sell short; see “Arboon Method”). I am saying, however, that I think Islamic finance offers insights into how finance can be better grounded within the “real economy”, from which it has grown increasingly disconnected. For example, in nominal terms financial markets are four times as big as real markets. Why? Is it for the benefit of industry? Or is the size of finance for the benefit of finance? Because every transaction has to have an asset earmarked with it, the Islamic financial sector cannot distance itself too far from the real sector. Perhaps that’s something worth exploring in the mainstream.

In sum, institutional investors have given up on MPT and are searching around for P-MPT principles because they want to really understand the assets they own and the risks they are exposed to. It seems to me that certain aspects of Islamic finance would greatly improve the visibility of assets and risks through a deconstruction of financial products and services that ultimately roots them in the real economy. And it’s in this regard that I think Islamic finance can be useful to P-MPT.

In Defense of Active Investment Management

Ashby Monk

If, like Warren Buffet, you think ‘diversification is protection against ignorance,’ then you have to read Scott Vincent’s recent manifesto on the merits of human judgment in investment decision-making (and the costs and consequences of the outbreak of modern portfolio theory in the investment management industry).

Vincent’s paper is entitled, “Is Portfolio Theory Harming Your Portfolio?”, and I think it is awesome. Why? Because he makes a profound argument in favor of economic geography and the geography of finance (though he may not totally know it). In short, he makes a passionate case for the impact of “local knowledge” on positive long-term risk adjusted returns. Here’s a blurb:

“There’s compelling evidence that the core theories behind the push to passive management do not work…they worked well in a laboratory where the environment around them could be perfectly controlled, but when put into practice the theories’ underlying assumptions and logic didn’t translate.

He’s talking about the core theories underpinning Modern Portfolio Theory (i.e., CAPM, EMH, and Portfolio Selection), which have driven many investors into passive, highly diversified strategies. The idea has been to minimize firm specific exposure to maximize risk adjusted return (as defined by MPT). Interestingly, these theories do not grasp the complexities (and inefficiencies) of the real word. For example,

“While Markowitz’s theory has serious issues when applied to real life, Sharpe’s CAPM is in even worse shape. CAPM is built on the back of Markowitz’s theory so it starts with all of the baggage and incorrect assumptions and then adds more. Some of the doozies include an assumption that all investors could borrow and lend at the riskless rate and an assumption that investors all have identical views of expected correlations, returns, and risks…

The theories have become so deeply ingrained in our financial system that we can’t see their folly. Their mathematics, as well as the precise nature of their output, gives us a sense of comfort which is critical in deploying large sums of money. They also lead to a misallocation of resources, however, causing giant distortions…

While some argue that a system which works 99 percent of the time is good enough, these are the same people who would sell you a burglar alarm that works perfectly well until a would-be-criminal approaches your home. What good is a system that breaks down only when you most need it? See the financial crisis of 2008 or Long-Term Capital Management for a compelling answer. ”

It’s like the classic movie 28 Days Later but with MPT worshipping finance professionals substituted for rage infected monkeys. And, true to the apocalyptic movie, we’re still trying to quarantine the damage from the “outbreak” of MPT. Admittedly, that may be stretching things too far, but all this MPT bashing does have a point in Vincent’s paper; he is making a case for sophisticated active managers. And, in so doing, he starts with the world’s most successful active manager, Warren Buffet:

“We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it.”

In other words, MPT gives investors a “pass” from having to actually understand the specific characteristics of what they are buying. But this, in turn, minimizes the ability of certain managers to actually generate returns. As Mr. Vincent notes,

“This argument turns CAPM on its head. A highly diversified, active manager cannot fully understand the risks he is taking on his positions so he may be paying too much for them, thus operating below the efficient frontier. While the concentrated manager is able to pick securities with an intimate understanding of their risk which helps him uncover assets whose prospective return more than compensates for the risk taken. The concentrated manager aims to buy assets that are beyond the efficient frontier.”

And, so, what should investors do about this?

“Take advantage of the fact that your neighbors are leaving for passive funds, as their passive investments could provide the inefficiency your manager seeks to exploit.”

In other words, the more money that’s being invested in accordance with “rational” models of finance, the more opportunities there will be for an informed trader (though not an inside trader) with asymmetric information to profit from being a bit “irrational”.

Can Transparency Be Profitable for SWFs?

Ashby Monk

A while back I had a discussion with a SWF executive who was trying to make the ‘business case’ for transparency. In other words, he wanted some insights and inspiration for how improving transparency might translate into higher returns for his organization. It was an enjoyable discussion, and we actually managed to come up with quite a few commercial reasons to improve transparency.

One point that really seemed to resonate with this individual was the need to get domestic “buy-in” for the SWF’s operations so as to ensure that it would have a “license to operate” in good and bad times. In other words, if the public was made to understand, and hopefully support, the operations of the fund, then the public would (in theory at least) not challenge the legitimacy of the SWF during short- to medium-term downturns in the market. This would ensure that the fund’s investment horizon would remain long-term, and it would never have to sell assets at a discount because domestic stakeholders changed their mind about a certain investment strategy.

Anyway, I decided to recount this anecdote because it looks like some similar conversations may have been taking place in other SWFs. In particular, I was interested to read this assessment of the recent investigation into the utility of active management that took place within Norway’s GPF-G:

“Where the fund stumbled, Ang says, was in its failure to clearly communicate the types of active strategies that it was pursuing. ‘The Norwegian parliament and public are sophisticated about these matters. For example, when equity markets fell dramatically in 2008, there was no outcry because the Norwegians understood that equity markets could crash.’…In the case of the more recent discord over losses in the assets under active management, Ang suggests that the Norwegian public should have been made aware of the active investment strategies the fund was pursuing prior to 2008. “They would have understood that such strategies might provide low returns or even losses in the short term, and been steeled to expect the downside,” he says.”

In other words, the government would not have been compelled to launch a complete re-evaluation of the fund’s active management policies if it had been more transparent about what it was doing!

And if that’s not compelling enough for you, there are other commercial reasons to improve transparency.  For example, in my discussions with the SWF executive, we also talked about how transparency can ensure access to markets and industries around the world that might otherwise be off-limits to a non-transparent, foreign, government entity. From the perspective of modern portfolio theory, increasing access to these markets and industries would improve risk adjusted return (i.e. further diversify the portfolio).

So there you have it — that’s two examples of how transparency might make a SWF more profitable. In short, there is value in securing the approval of domestic and foreign constituencies…


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This website is a project of Professor Gordon L. Clark and Dr. Ashby Monk of the School of Geography and the Environment at the University of Oxford. Their research on sovereign wealth funds is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and The Rotman International Centre for Pension Management.

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