Posts Tagged 'PNG'

PNG Unveils Draft SWF Law

Ashby Monk

Papua New Guinea has finally published a draft law for its new sovereign fund: “The Organic Law on the Sovereign Wealth Fund“. Here are some of the key points to take away:

  • PNG will be setting up both a stabilization fund and a development fund.
  • The stabilization fund seems fairly straightforward, while the development fund looks and sounds like a savings fund but it comes with spending and draw-down rules associated with development objectives.
  • The investment mandate will be set by the Minister.
  • The Board will set the investment strategies.
  • A new Secretariat and Executive Officer be responsible for carrying out the Board’s directions.
  • All the assets in both funds will be invested exclusively in foreign assets.
  • The Board will be made up of six private sector members and an ex-officio member of the Treasury.
  • Board members will have to have…’…substantial experience or expertise and professional credibility and significant standing in at least one of the following fields: 1) Investing in financial assets; 2) the management of investments in financial assets; and 3) corporate governance.’
  • The Board member must also be “a person of integrity, independence of mind and good reputation.”
  • Board members cannot be political candidates or members of government (at any level).
  • The ex-officio member of the Board will be placed on leave from their government jobs while on the Board.

I won’t go into too much detail on all of these points because this is just a draft law and a lot can change. But I will say that the document looks pretty good. When it comes to developing countries — especially one that already had an ‘awkward‘ experience with a SWF —  many are often concerned that the investment process will be politicized and corrupted. On this one point, the PNG law seems to be quite solid. The procedures to appoint someone to the Board are really quite sensible. So we’ll have to wait and see of this sensibility makes it in to the final document.

PNG Ready to Launch SWF

Ashby Monk

When Papua New Guinea’s LNG project starts bringing in revenue in 2014, it’s expected to generate a windfall of $50 billion for the country. To put this in perspective, that’s five times the country’s GDP and translates into roughly $10,000 per person (in a country with a GDP per capita of just over $2,000). So I think it’s fair to say that the destabilizing effects of an influx of cash of this level could be catastrophic if it’s not managed well.

But, not to worry dear readers, Papua New Guinea’s Finance Minister, Don Polye, has a plan. He is finalizing legislation that will underpin the country’s resource revenue management and is getting ready to launch a new sovereign fund. That’s good news! Let’s see some of the details from Mr. Polye:

Objective: “The key role is to manage the massive fluctuations in our minerals revenues, which have moved from only 3% to 20% of non-mineral GDP.” That’s a very good objective, as resource revenue volatility is one of the main drivers of the resource curse. So far so good.

Structure: The state will retain full ownership and control over the fund’s assets, and the fund will be fully integrated into the budget and fiscal framework: “This is to ensure that all revenues (including dividends) from the PNG LNG project as well as from other mineral and petroleum projects and the timing of all expenditures could be most effectively used to advance PNG’s social and economic development.” This is similar to the Norwegian and Chilean approach to running SWFs, and it has clearly worked well in those regions. However, making this structure work in PNG will require a very sophisticated governance structure. For example, I worry about keeping the new SWF independent from the short-term whims of politicians and bureaucrats. That’s not to say that PNG won’t be successful. It just means we’ll have to wait to see the formal governance framework to know if it has mitigated this risk factor appropriately.

Frontier Finance: The SWF will provide the government with an opportunity to help build capacity and capability in the domain of finance. “We need to develop our intellectual capital, our technical expertise and skills, our entrepreneurial strengths and corporate abilities.” As such, the new SWF will be “onshore managed, offshore invested and onshore spent…We will develop ourselves to run and operate with a corporate or private sector mindset but on democratic principles.” Running a SWF is very hard. Running a SWF outside of a traditional financial center is even harder. So PNG will face the same problems as its peers operating on the frontiers of finance (e.g., human resources, governance, operational expertise, risk management, access to deals, etc.).

Stakeholder Relations: The government will soon launch an education and awareness program to foster understanding of the SWF. I think this is crucial, as getting buy-in from the local communities will be essential to the sustainability of this new fund.

Anyway, I’m really looking forward to seeing some of the more detailed information on this fund. In my view, PNG’s future depends on getting the design and governance of this sovereign fund right! However, as readers of this blog know, Papua New Guinea has the dubious distinction of having sponsored a failed SWF: The Mineral Resource Stabilisation Fund. Originally designed in 1974 to hold the proceeds of a the Panguna Copper Mine – and later expanded to include all tax, royalty and dividend payments from major mining and oil projects in the country – the MRSF proved to be poorly designed and governed for its mission and, ultimately, it was shut down in 1999 due to excess draw-downs.

Let’s hope PNG gets it right this time. I think they will.

Deep Thoughts by Hillary Clinton

Ashby Monk

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stopped off in Papua New Guinea on her way from here (I’m still in Malaysia) to New Zealand yesterday. While she was in PNG, she had some wise words on the potential dangers of resource wealth and (!) the valuable role of a SWF therein:

“Thanks to your abundant natural resources, Papua New Guinea has the opportunity not only to be more developed and provide more benefits for your people, but to become a strong regional leader and a model for reducing poverty and spurring development.

But as you and I discussed, in order to achieve that, there will have to be a commitment to good governance and accountability and transparency, and you’re taking steps to plan to do just that. The planning for a sovereign wealth fund is a very important commitment.

…There is a phrase, “resource curse.” Countries with abundant natural resources like oil and gas or gold or minerals, if they’re not handled right, can actually end up making a country poorer instead of richer. I will not name names, but there are countries in the world that started with the same hopes as Papua New Guinea with all of the excitement that I know is in this country because of the resources that were discovered, but they weren’t handled right. So 20, 30, 40 years later, people have actually gotten poorer. And I know that will not happen here because the people and the government of this country will do it in the right way.

…We want to help you write and implement the institutions and regulations that will make it possible to manage these new revenues wisely. Our Departments of Interior and Treasury are already working with the respective cabinet ministries here to work to see how the United States can be of help.” (emphasis added)

While Clinton won’t ‘name names’, I think PNG will freely admit that they are one of the frontier economies that has struggled to manage resource wealth. They even have had failed attempts at setting up SWFs in the past, such as the Mineral Resource Stabilization Fund, which was set up in the 1970s and eventually exhausted. Anyway, PNG has some big hurdles to overcome, but I’m optimistic about its chances. With some assistance from the US and Australia (and I hear Norway) where it is warranted (and welcomed), PNG can overcome the resource curse.

Managing Wealth In Frontier Economies

Ashby Monk

What happens when “the most impoverished region in one of the world’s poorest countries“ wakes up one morning and figures out, “We’re rich!?” Well, Norimitsu Onishi’s article in the NYT today on Papua New Guinea offers some remarkable insights. Using a series of compelling stories, Onishi highlights the immense societal, cultural, political and economic challenges faced by frontier economies that do in fact discover they are resource rich. Have a gander at these remarkable excerpts.

On the difficult economic geography:

“Constant tribal wars over land, women and pigs — the last being prized measures of wealth, used to pay for dowries and settle disputes — have grown deadlier in the past decade with the easy availability of high-powered rifles smuggled in from Indonesia, just to the west, which are exchanged for the marijuana grown here…”

And on the temptations associated with this sudden influx of wealth:

“…A short drive away, Hamon Matipe, the septuagenarian chief of Kili, confirmed that he had received that sum [$120,000] four months earlier. In details corroborated by the local authorities, Mr. Matipe explained that the provincial government had paid him for village land alongside the Southern Highlands’ one major road, where the government planned to build a police barracks. … Mr. Matipe said he had given most of the money to his 10 wives. But he had used about $20,000 to buy 48 pigs, which he used as a dowry to obtain a 15-year-old bride from a faraway village, paying well above the going rate of 30 pigs. He and some 30 village men then celebrated by buying 15 cases of beer, costing about $800. All the money is now gone,” Mr. Matipe said. ‘But I’m very happy about the company, ExxonMobil. Before, I had nothing. But because of the money, I was able to buy pigs and get married again.’”

What a story! Basically, the Chief – ostensibly the wise elder of the local village — received $120,000 for his land, which he immediately spent on women and alcohol. That may be a crude simplification of the story, but how else would you interpret this? Even the pigs he purchased were intended as a dowry for his 11th (!) wife.

Now, to be fair, it’s ridiculous for any American (and I do hold an American passport) to comment on the consumption habits of other countries; the amount of credit card debt we’ve amassed in this country is both astounding and depressing. (…and in reading this story, I can’t help but think of a similar story from my undergraduate days in which a lump sum was blown on beer and oreos…)

Still, wouldn’t it be wonderful to come up with some sort of governing institutions that can help frontier economies better manage their resource windfalls? No doubt the Chief would have liked to make his entire village better off for generations to come?

And, since you’re reading this story on this blog, you’ve no doubt guessed that I’m thinking about a SWF. But, surprise, PNG is well ahead of me on this. In fact, the country has been actively considering a series of new SWFs, which it will direct the revenues from its stunningly large LNG project, which will come on line in 2014. (This project could bring as much as $50 billion into PNG, which translates into roughly $10,000 per person in a country with a GDP per capita of just over $2,000. That’s a lot). Let’s turn back to the NYT article again:

“While conceding the danger of social disruptions, Papua New Guinea officials are adamant that the windfall will be used for development and not siphoned off by the well connected. Mr. O’Neill, the finance minister, said the government planned to channel the revenue into three sovereign wealth funds that would be overseen by a board of advisers, including foreigners, adding that the government would also be held accountable by the World Bank and other creditors.”

Now, PNG has the dubious distinction of having been the sponsor of a failed SWF: the Mineral Resource Stabilisation Fund, which was shut down in 1999 due to excess draw-downs. However, I think this failure offers PNG a leg up on other frontier economies in a similar position, as it knows all too well the pitfalls of poorly designed and governed SWFs.

As such, PNG has been working closely with Australia in order to set up the appropriate fiscal and macro-economic infrastructure in order to ensure that the LNG wealth coming on line helps PNG advance its development (rather than ushering the country into the resource curse). And this will include a SWF. I also think they should be paying attention to Alaska, where the SWF connects the oil wealth directly to the people through a yearly dividend. And yet, centralized asset management and decision-making by bonafied experts ensures that the assets will be around for generations to come. That’s a model I can get behind!

Australia and PNG Bond Over SWF

Ashby Monk

Relations between Australia and Papua New Guinea have been ‘on again off again’ over the past decade (for reasons that I find downright bizarre). Still, given that PNG is Australia’s nearest neighbor, the two countries have worked hard to stay close (which was made easier when Howard was ousted by Rudd). Encouragingly, the two countries have been getting on quite well over the past few years. And, interestingly, it seems PNG’s planned SWF has offered policymakers in both countries a new opportunity to rekindle their close relationship.

As you are no doubt aware, Australia has sponsored an SWF — the Future Fund – since 2006. And when it set up the fund, the government made a commitment to international best practices in design and governance. For example, the Future Fund has managed to tame political interests in such a way that it balances the interests of future generations against short-term necessitates. In short, certain aspects of the Future Fund’s design could be usefully applied to PNG’s new fund, which is why the two countries have been talking so much lately.

This is what Australia’s Foreign Minister Stephen Smith had to say about this cooperation in a recent interview:

“…the LNG project does provide the opportunity for PNG to transform itself economically. So we’ve been working very closely with PNG, giving them all of our assistance and expertise in terms of establishing sovereign wealth funds to enable the revenue stream off the project to go into a sovereign wealth fund to be there effectively for a long term enduring benefit…I’ve had a lot of meetings with my PNG counterparts. The last couple of meetings I’ve had in Melbourne and in PNG itself have been in my view two of the most productive meetings that Australia and PNG have had, because there’s a very clear focus on getting the liquefied natural gas arrangements right. Of course it’s a matter for PNG and the sovereign government of PNG, but we’re rendering every assistance, and then doing better on our development assistance program.”

One point bears flagging from the above passage: ‘…the best meeting that Melbourne and PNG have had.’ That’s a strong statement. Clearly, setting up a new SWF has been a catalyst for productive cooperation between the two countries. More broadly, this is something we are increasingly seeing among and between other SWFs and their sponsors throughout the world.

This gets me thinking about when I decided to focus my research on SWFs back in 2007. At the time, I didn’t give much thought to the idea that SWFs could become mechanisms to facilitate inter-state cooperation or augment international relations (I guess, if I’m honest, I kind of had the opposite view). But inter-state cooperation and collaboration via SWFs is happening so much these days, it really merits our attention. In fact, I think there’s probably a nice research paper in there somewhere. And for your case study, you need look no further than Australia and PNG.

Papua New Guinea: Lessons Learned

Ashby Monk

Papua New Guinea has the dubious distinction of having been the sponsor of a failed SWF: the Mineral Resource Stabilisation Fund. Originated in 1974 to hold the proceeds of a the Panguna Copper Mine – and later expanded to include all tax, royalty and dividend payments from major mining and oil projects in the country – the MRSF proved to be poorly designed and governed for its mission and, ultimately, it was shut down in 1999 due to excess draw-downs.

Today, this failure offers PNG some unique insights as it contemplates its looming LNG bounty and will clearly affect its new plans for LNG revenues. And, perhaps surprisingly, PNG has once again decided that a SWF is the way to go with its new resource strategy.

On cue, the country’s National Research Institute has just published  a new report by Peter Johnson that lays out how the country can overcome the resource curse (and its past SWF failure) by setting up a well-designed SWF. (There is also a nice interview available on Radio Australia that details some of the report’s findings.)  Specifically, Johnson examines the cases where SWFs have (and have not) worked in order to tease out lessons for PNG. As he says in his radio interview, his intention was to take some of the best international examples and adapt them to PNG’s unique “flavor and focus”, all the while avoiding the mistakes made by countries (including his own) that have had SWF flops. So, for example, he writes about the failure of the MRSF, describing its main problem as follows:

“A lack of sound governance and poor service delivery ultimately led to the fund being mismanaged and wasted.”

In addition, Johnson examined the Timor Leste Wealth Fund, the Kiribati Revenue Equalisation Fund, and the Alaska Permanent Fund for insights on developing a new fund specifically for PNG.

On a broader note, it’s become standard practice for potential SWF sponsors, such as PNG, to reach out to other countries that already have SWFs in order to learn from their experience. For example, Natsuko Waki of Reuters has a nice article this morning that describes how Angola, Ghana and Nigeria have looked to Asia and the ME for SWF inspiration:

“…they are also increasingly looking at developing Asian and Gulf nations, where funds are often managed in an opaque but strategically efficient manner, which may suit Africa better.”

But, as Natsuko notes, there is no simple “cut and paste” model for these funds. And, in the case of PNG, Johnson seems to get it, which is why he has come up with a list of specific objectives and constraints that any new PNG SWF will need to achieve:

  • “broadening PNGs economic base to avoid the destabilising effects of future commodity price shocks;
  • stabilising the macro-economic environment through investing revenues offshore;
  • creating a political will for institutional reforms to substantially improve policy development, monitoring and auditing of government expenditure;
  • integrating resource revenues into the Budget framework;
  • creating a sense of ownership by the people of PNG;
  • following the design of the Sovereign Wealth Fund on the SWF Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (Santiago Principles);
  • creating a clear purpose and objective for how the revenue is to be used; and
  • maximising the financial returns subject to appropriate risk.”

That all seems pretty straightforward and sensible (if ambitious). So, the real question then is how a new SWF can achieve all this. And this is where things get interesting: apparently Johnson doesn’t think that a single SWF can do all of the above – which is why he thinks PNG will need two separate SWFs. Here’s his logic:

“The first fund (the Future Fund) will have a long-term savings objective and the second fund (a stabilisation fund) will have a macro-economic stabilisation objective. The first fund imposes a great degree of restraint on expenditure, while the second fund allows for a high degree of expenditure flexibility. The funds can be used for development expenditure while at the same time contributing to macro-economic stabilisation.”

Johnson suggests that SWFs shouldn’t try to do too much, lest they fail at all of it. Instead, he argues that SWFs should have well-defined mandates that don’t allow for too much flexibility in decision-making. And, I have to say, I agree. And before you throw up your hands at the idea of two SWFs in one country, consider that the State of Oklahoma has managed to justify to its voters having two SWFs. So why not PNG? Perhaps two SWFs will succeed where one has already failed…

Making LNG Work for PNG

Ashby Monk

I noted back in November 2009 that Papua New Guinea was considering a new SWF to help manage looming resource revenues. The country has an enormous liquefied natural gas project that could bring in something in the range of $50 billion. For a small, developing country, that’s a lot of money. Think of it this way, it’s five times the country’s GDP and translates into roughly $10,000 per person (in a country with a GDP per capita of just over $2,000). The hope is that a SWF will help to avoid the resource curse and turn that cash into widespread socio-economic benefits.

Despite the fact that the revenues aren’t coming on line until 2014, PNG appears to have already started its SWF due diligence; the Treasury has just released a “Sovereign Wealth Fund Discussion Paper” that outlines various factors that the government should take into consideration in setting up their new fund. It’s actually an interesting read, as the paper provides some insight into the thought process that underpins the creation of a SWF. As the report says,

“…it is possible that the emergence of LNG as a major revenue source may give rise to major macroeconomic pressures such as Dutch disease, which are more likely to be prevalent when a country relies heavily on revenues from commodity exports.”

Yeah, no kidding. We’ve seen plenty of examples where resource wealth has not translated into improvements in socio-economic indicators. Ironically, PNG itself has failed in this regard. Its Mineral Resource Stabilization Fund (MRSF), which operated from 1974 to 2001, had a very mixed record:

“A key limitation of the MRSF was that its funds were invested onshore rather than offshore. There was a high opportunity cost associated with this approach – through low domestic interest earned and limited scope of growing the value of the fund in a small financial market. Other deficiencies included weak governance arrangements and the poor integration with the Budget and operation of fiscal policy…

…The country is still recovering from the adverse economic effects of the last mineral boom on the tradeable sectors.”

Encouragingly, PNG has come to recognize the importance of organizational and institutional design in ensuring the success of its new SWF. In fact, the paper has an entire section entitled “Design Issues” (…which, I have to admit, warms the cockles of my heart…). For example, the paper notes:

“..the governance and design issues are also likely to come under more pressure…As experienced with the MRSF, governance issues came under a lot of pressure which partly reflected the structure and composition of the Fund‟s Board. As observed by the World Bank, the board was dominated by government officials, and as a result, found it difficult to resist government pressure for large withdrawals.”

The report goes on to highlight many ways to avoid these design problems, and, more generally, how to ensure that the fund is successful. I won’t go into all of the factors here–the paper is sufficiently concise and clear for any reader.

But I have to say, PNG seems to be on top of it this go around. And it’s also clear from the paper that the Santiago Principles have been a very important design influence. Say what you will about the IWG, GAPP and the Santiago Principles–and many have said some pretty harsh things–it is clear that GAPP is at least having some effect. While it may not be the effect originally intended (i.e. forcing existing funds to be more transparent) it is creating positive externalities in PNG.

Get to know Nauru

Ashby Monk

Did you know that the Republic of Nauru has a SWF? Actually, perhaps this is a more appropriate question: Have you ever heard of the Republic of Nauru? Chances are that the world’s smallest independent republic—an Island Nation in Microneasia—has not come to your attention. Still, Nauru has some great lessons for countries considering a SWF. Why? Because it appears to have unsuccessfully used a SWF to manage its resource rents. Indeed, the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust, which was established in 1968, has been almost entirely exhausted (i.e. squandered) due to poor governance and mismanagement of funds.

From a research perspective, this is a golden opportunity, one that Martin Gould of Australia’s Treasury has not missed. He has a new research paper that uses the Nauru fund—and those of Kiribati, Timor-Leste and PNG—to outline some important lessons on how to ensure that SWFs achieve their objectives. As Gould notes:

“A key challenge for developing countries endowed with natural resources is to transform those resources into sustained improvements in living standards. A number of Pacific island countries have utilised sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) to manage government revenue from exhaustible natural resources with the aim of improving development outcomes. Experience in the region has been mixed — some SWFs have aided intergenerational equity and macroeconomic stability while others have struggled to bring about improvements in wellbeing.”

I like this paper, as it draws some really useful lessons from the experiences of these Island nations. Here are Gould’s take-aways:

  • If you have a high debt burden and a high borrowing cost, you should use your sovereign wealth to retire debt NOT set up a SWF. The chances of making returns within the SWF sufficient to justify not retiring debt are low (and the investment risks required to do so are high).
  • All SWFs need a clear objective and mandate, with strict withdrawal guidelines and borrowing rules.
  • The SWF should be integrated into the broader budget process.
  • SWF assets should (in most cases) be held off-shore. This will mitigate Dutch Disease and increase the number of investment options.
  • SWFs must be designed and governed according to international best-practice. For example, it needs professional investment management. And transparency around the operations of the SWF is vital.

I think these are all eminently sensible. And given that Gould draws these insights from successful and unsuccessful case studies, I think the advice is that much more powerful. In short, if you sponsor a SWF, you should spend some time getting to know Nauru and it’s failed attempt to manage commodity wealth through a SWF.


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This website is a project of Professor Gordon L. Clark and Dr. Ashby Monk of the School of Geography and the Environment at the University of Oxford. Their research on sovereign wealth funds is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and The Rotman International Centre for Pension Management.

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