Posts Tagged 'singapore'

Drawing Inspiration from Islamic Constraints

Ashby Monk

There is a growing frustration with the traditional theories of finance among institutional investors. For example, at the Institutional Investor Roundtable I attended in Singapore last week, only ~15 of the 71 sovereigns and pensions in the room said they viewed MPT as offering valuable tools for portfolio construction and asset allocation. Moreover, 35 of these funds indicated that they were already operating according to ‘post-modern portfolio theory’ principles. I think that’s fascinating, but what does P-MPT actually look like?

Given that I’m also coming off a week in Malaysia — which is the global hub of Islamic finance — I can’t help but reflect on some of the lessons that this niche market may offer the mainstream. Why? Because there are some really innovative things happening these days in Islamic finance. (And for those of you that think Islamic finance is not worth paying attention to, consider this: Goldman Sachs, in October, registered a $2 billion Islamic bond program → pay attention.)

Anyway, as you are no doubt aware, Islamic finance imposes some pretty serious constraints on its denizens. For example, there’s a ban on excessive speculation. There’s a ban on leverage. There’s a ban on selling things you don’t own. There’s a ban on charging interest. There’s a ban on investing in firms that rely on interest revenue or that carry a lot of debt. There’s the requirement that income must be derived as profits from shared business risk. And so on. On the surface, then, you’d expect Islamic finance to be severely constrained. And, you’d be right. But I’d argue that these constraints may offer opportunities for mainstream finance.

In the world of intellectual property, the workarounds that people come up with to avoid infringing a patent are sometimes more sophisticated and valuable than the originally patented concept. So, my thinking goes, perhaps the constraints imposed on Islamic financiers will lead to creative innovations and products that ultimately improve finance generally. Why? Because the constraints listed above actually sound reasonable. And, moreover, since Islamic finance is firmly rooted in capitalism (i.e., the profit motive and private ownership remain firmly intact), these constraints (and their workarounds) are compatible with non-Islamic finance as well.

Now, I’m not saying all investors should avoid pork products or sell their alcohol stocks. I’m also not arguing for a return to “simple finance”. (Note: There are, today, Islamic hedge funds, Islamic derivatives traders and even Islamic mechanisms to sell short; see “Arboon Method”). I am saying, however, that I think Islamic finance offers insights into how finance can be better grounded within the “real economy”, from which it has grown increasingly disconnected. For example, in nominal terms financial markets are four times as big as real markets. Why? Is it for the benefit of industry? Or is the size of finance for the benefit of finance? Because every transaction has to have an asset earmarked with it, the Islamic financial sector cannot distance itself too far from the real sector. Perhaps that’s something worth exploring in the mainstream.

In sum, institutional investors have given up on MPT and are searching around for P-MPT principles because they want to really understand the assets they own and the risks they are exposed to. It seems to me that certain aspects of Islamic finance would greatly improve the visibility of assets and risks through a deconstruction of financial products and services that ultimately roots them in the real economy. And it’s in this regard that I think Islamic finance can be useful to P-MPT.

GIC in a Risky World

Ashby Monk

Singapore is small, it lacks natural resources, and it sits in a reasonably precarious geopolitical setting that could ultimately be hostile to its independence and economic prosperity. What to do?  To manage the risks to its physical and economic security, the government has built up a large cushion of financial reserves that (it hopes) will reinforce the country’s autonomy and independence in times of crisis. This is where the Government Investment Corporation of Singapore comes into play. Indeed, the political elites specifically see the GIC as a tool for managing the potential adverse consequences of living in an uncertain world. For example, the latest edition of the GIC’s annual report has a clear theme: The future is challenging and uncertain and the GIC stands to minimize and manage these challenges and uncertainties for the benefit of all Singaporeans.

All this is to say that the GIC’s existence and legitimacy is a function of the risks faced by Singapore. So it will not be a surprise to you if the GIC is ahead of the curve when it comes to “risk management” practices. And this fact comes through quite clearly in the fund’s annual report. Indeed, the GIC’s approach to “risk management” has three distinct components: portfolio risk; process risk and people risk. I think you’ll be particularly interested in the latter two (given that portfolio risk is the more standard form of risk management). Here’s a blurb from the report:

“Managing Process Risk: All investment and operations staff are required to identify, evaluate, manage and report risks in their own areas of responsibility, and comply with established risk policies, guidelines, limits and procedures. New investment products or strategies are subject to a risk identification and assessment process conducted by a crossfunctional group. This ensures that risks associated with the new product or activity are identified and analysed prior to the under taking of the new investment. Part of this process is ensuring that the required people and infrastructure such as systems, procedures and controls, are in place to manage these risks…We continuously monitor a set of key risk indicators pertinent to our business, in order to manage risk of loss resulting from possible slippages in GIC’s operations. Indicators such as late transaction processing, late report releases, stale prices and system downtime highlight potential risk areas to be addressed in a timely manner…Throughout the year, internal and external auditors scrutinize all operations and business processes. The deficiencies identified are required to be addressed within agreed time frames and reported to senior management.

Managing People Risk: Consistent with our long-term orientation, GIC’s remuneration policies and practices support and reinforce a culture of prudence in risk-taking, and recognise and reward our people on the basis of sustainable results. We require our staff to observe GIC’s code of ethics, maintain exemplar y conduct, and comply with laws and regulations, including prohibitions against insider trading and other unlawful market conduct. These are among the guidelines set out in our compliance manual maintained by the legal and compliance department. Staff must protect confidential information and handle material non-public information with due care. The manual also states policies relating to the management of conflicts of interest, gifts and entertainment, copyright rules, personal investments and whistle-blowing. We provide regular training to all staff to keep them current with compliance requirements. Staff also receive training on exchange regulations relevant to their responsibilities.”

Clearly, the GIC takes “risk management” to a new level by including “people” and “process” into the more traditional approaches focused on “portfolios”. Why has the GIC gone a step farther than other funds in thinking about risk? I’d wager that the precarity of Singapore’s geographic position (both physical and economic) has engendered a deep-rooted risk management culture in the GIC that colors all of their decisions. After all, the GIC exists to manage risks for the government and the country, so it should be natural to apply this risk logic to their own operations.

Anyway, I think that’s quite interesting. And it offers some additional insights as to why the GIC probably remains quite secretive about certain aspects of its organization. For example, the CIC’s annual report (which came out yesterday) included detailed financial statements; the GIC report had nothing of the sort. Perhaps this too is a sort of ‘geopolitical’ risk management (to prevent neighbors from ‘coveting’ their ever growing pool of resources a bit too much).

Temasek in One Sentence or Less

Ashby Monk

Temasek Holdings’ new 2011 annual report has some solid graphics that highlight the Singaporean fund’s strong track record of returns…

.

…and also highlights the fund’s overwhelming emerging markets focus.

.

Investing for Infinity

Ashby Monk

I recently came across an intriguing statement (h/t EIU) by Norway’s Finance Minister Sigbjørn Johnsen about the country’s SWF:

“One could say we are investing for infinity.”

I think we’d all agree, that’s a long investment time horizon! Now, Johnsen made this comment back in September while trying to justify why the Norwegian fund was investing in debt from Greece Spain, Italy and Portugal (which wasn’t going over all too well). So, it was probably more political rhetoric than anything concrete.

Still, what are the implications for investment strategy of an “infinite” time horizon? It’s a wonderful thought experiment, in my opinion. So let’s run with it for a second.

I’d say that nearly all of the intellectual horse power of asset managers operating in financial markets today is focused on generating returns in the short to medium term (say 24 months out). If you’re investing with a view to generating returns in 24 years or even 24 decades, how would that affect your investment strategy? Such a time horizon, which is backed up by enormous scale, affords SWFs unparalleled ability to hold risky assets.

So, in my view, it should affect their investment strategies. If SWFs (and their masters) really believe the “investing for infinity” comment, then they need to be putting much more money into long-term asset classes — such as unlisted infrastructure assets, private equity and real estate — where private investors can’t hang over the long term.

The real question then is whether SWFs are doing that; are they taking advantage of their “infinite” time horizon? Some are and some aren’t. Let’s start with Norway, which inspired this discussion. As it turns out, when FM Johnsen made his comment about “infinity”, the Norwegian fund didn’t have a direct infrastructure investment program and was only starting to develop a real estate portfolio. In other words, the “investing for infinity” was a nice soundbite to explain away investments in Greek debt, but it wasn’t an “investment belief” that was driving behavior within the fund. (Granted, that may be in the process of changing thanks to Elroy Dimson.)

Now, let’s look at AIMCo, the Albertan SWF, which is pushing hard into unlisted infrastructure assets and really setting the standards in terms of direct infrastructure investing. In other words, it is moving into an asset class that suits its profile, taking advantage of its inherent characteristics. To me, that’s how a fund with an infinite time horizon should be operating. So, well done, Alberta!

Who Deserves Credit for the Big SWF Idea?

Ashby Monk

If you follow me on Twitter, you’ll know that I’ve been playing some SWF word association games. Well I’ve got another one for you: If I say, ‘governments that kicked off the SWF era’ or, how about, ‘governments that deserve credit for the big SWF idea’, what would you say?

At first blush, I’d expect you to come out with “Kuwait” or “Abu Dhabi” or “Singapore” or (if you’re really good) even “Kiribati”. But I can pretty much guarantee that you wouldn’t say, “the UK” or “USA”. After all, SWFs aren’t Western, right? In fact, they represent challenges to Western hegemony, don’t they? They’re products of emerging market imbalances, aren’t they?

Well, maybe I’m late to the party here, but I think credit for the ‘big SWF idea’ actually resides with…the UK and the US. I know that seems odd and runs counter to our current notions about SWFs. But let me — a self-proclaimed history dimwit — give you a history lesson (or at least try to).

It’s widely noted (and accepted) that Kuwait was the first country, in 1953, to set up a SWF. In this case, the acclaim for this remarkable decision is often given to the forward thinking ruler of Kuwait at the time, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah. In his wisdom, he apparently decided that the money should be set aside for the long-term welfare of the people of Kuwait. And I don’t doubt that. Rather, I’d simply note that this SWF, which was known at the time as the Kuwait Investment Board, was established eight years before the country attained independence from the UK. And, moreover, the fund was set up in London. So, at the very minimum, we can assume that the Brits had some influence over this decision (and may in fact have had the ‘big SWF idea’).

The second country to set up a SWF, in 1956, is widely accepted to be Kiribati. In this case, a fund was set up for phosphate mining revenue. The history buffs among you will recognize that Kiribati was still under British rule at the time (until 1971 actually). And it is known that the British administration was behind the levy on phosphate exports that ultimately led to the Kirabati Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund. So, once again, the Brits were there at the beginning.

Now things start to get really interesting. Any guess as to what the third country was to set up a SWF in 1958? To be fair, that’s sort of a trick question, as it was sponsored by a sub-national government: the US state of New Mexico and the State Investment Council. And do you know who set up the fourth SWF in 1974? The US State of Wyoming and the Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund. And North America wasn’t done yet, as the next two SWFs to pop up were in Alaska and Alberta in 1976. In short, the Brit’s Anglo-American cousins in North America also played an important role in legitimizing SWFs in these early years.

Now, it’s true that Singapore set up Temasek in 1974, but, at the time, it was really just a holding company and not technically an international portfolio investor. (And, by the way, Singapore was also a British Colony until 1961, so there was probably some remaining British influence.) It’s also true that the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority was established in 1976, but, there again, it’s probably reasonable to suggest the Brits had some influence in that decision (as the UAE had a ‘special treaty’ with the UK until 1971).

All that being said, I don’t want to give the Brits too much credit here. After all, they didn’t bother to set up a SWF of their own when oil revenues came pouring in from the North Sea! (A decision that still irks Scotland something fierce). To be sure, this would be a very welcome pool of cash today.

I guess I just find it interesting that the first SWFs were set up under the purview of British and American governments. Over time, the West has come to see SWFs as “foreign” and “non-Western”. And yet, they were ultimately British and American creations; the idea and their legitimacy actually came from the West!

And, the more I think about it, the more it makes sense. Both countries were already home to global financial centers (New York and London) thanks to the financial capital flowing out of pre-funded pensions and into asset managers’ coffers. Let’s also not forget that Markowitz unveiled Modern Portfolio Theory in a 1952 Journal of Finance article. As such, these countries were clearly in a ‘financial state of mind’, which means it wouldn’t have been too far a leap for these governments to see an opportunity to use financial markets in innovative ways. Enter the SWF.

Quick Thoughts on GIC’s Annual Report

Ashby Monk

I’m in New York for an SWF conference at Columbia University, so posts may be a bit light for the next few days. Nonetheless, I remembered to download the GIC’s newly released annual report before boarding my flight yesterday. And I was glad I did, as it’s pretty interesting. Here are some quick reactions I had while reading it.

First, I have to give credit to the GIC. This is its second annual report, which means it is getting in the habit of sharing information publicly (thanks, in large part, to the Santiago Principles). Say what you will about the content (and I’m about to say something about the content), but this is a very positive development.

Second, while the GIC does deserve kudos, this report is short on actual content. Even if I’m generous, I count no more than 26 pages of the 53 in the report that impart relevant information (and that includes a page with a single world map showing the fund’s 9 offices). The rest is just blank pages, transitions, bios and other filler. All of these empty pages leave the reader wanting more. And so I had a thought. While it may sound a bit odd, I think the China Investment Corporation’s recent annual report could be a useful model for the GIC next year. After all, the CIC managed to go into quite a bit of detail on certain aspects of its operations (even offering up an in-depth case study at one point), while nonetheless leaving certain polemical aspects of its operations to the side. The CIC seems to have gotten the balance right; the GIC has a bit more work to do.

Third, one of the big themes in this report was the GIC’s “core values”. These go by the name “PRIME”, or Prudence, Respect, Integrity, Merit, and Excellence. A bit cheesy, perhaps, but I’m (slowly) coming around to the idea of core values. Initially, I was of the mind that organizations have functions, not values, and if the form of the organization is properly designed (to facilitate its functions) then articulating a set “values” was superfluous (and potentially confusing). However, I’ve recently witnessed the impact that these values can have on the day-to-day work practices of employees at all levels. For example, when asked to make a subjective decision, the core values can be a useful touchstone or guide. (Still, I hope the GIC didn’t overpay some consultants to wow them with their PowerPoint skills and their ability to create witty acronyms…)

Fourth, I was quite interested to read the paragraph about how the GIC evaluates its performance internally:

“As an investment management company, we evaluate our performance in three ways: whether we achieve a reasonable rate of return above global inflation for the total portfolio; how each investment professional or team performs against specific market benchmarks or absolute return targets; and how our managers’ results compare with those of their peers in the industry.”

That’s solid. Overcoming agency problems within SWFs requires strict accountability of investment teams and managers (which, one would hope, would then be linked with compensation packages). While it would be great to know more about how the GIC does this, it looks as if the fund really gets it.

Finally, the report says the GIC has 43% of its assets invested in the Americas, 30% in Europe, 24% in Asia, and 3% Australasia. So here’s my question: how can a fund guesstimated to be worth close to $200 billion not find a single investment in Africa? I’ve made my African pitch many times before, so I won’t repeat it again here (just see this and this). I’ll just note that investing in Africa has commercial benefit to large diversified investors. And if a fund is hesitant, it should go talk to these guys. They’re looking to make solid returns in Africa and have already signed up some big co-investors.

OK. I’m off to the conference…

How Many Presidents Does it Take to Run a SWF?

Ashby Monk

If you’re Temasek Holding, the answer to the above question is apparently three:

  • One to oversee institutional and capacity building initiatives (Mr Hsieh Fu Hua);
  • One to provide leadership in value creation and oversee engagement with Australia and New Zealand (Mr Simon Israel);
  • And one to oversee Temasek’s interests in financial services as well as support its strategic engagement in the Americas (Mr Gregory Curl).

According to the Temasek press release:

“Hsieh Fu Hua, Simon Israel and Greg Curl will work in close partnership with Temasek CEO Ho Ching to support the Temasek senior leadership team to build a sustainable institution that creates and delivers long term shareholder value.”

All three Presidents will be at work by September 1, which will take some of the workload off of Ho Ching. Recall that Ho was looking to step down from her position of CEO almost a year ago when the Goodyear fiasco forced her to stay on. So, I’m guessing this new troika of Presidents is as much a “try out” for potential successors as anything else. So, who’s it going to be? Which one of these Presidents will become Temasek’s next CEO? There can be only one…

SeaTown: Private Sector Endorsed Public Investments?

Ashby Monk

Back in February, I noted that Temasek may be launching an innovative investment vehicle that would act as a sort of ‘externally managed sovereign hedge fund’. With a tentative name of  SeaTown (which is English for Temasek) and Charles Ong at its helm, the new ‘SHF’ was purportedly going to be wholly owned by Temasek and invest in a diverse range of assets and geographies. But at the time that was all just speculation, as Temasek was keeping pretty mum about the whole thing.

Well no more — Temasek’s 2010 Annual Report has a few more details about its SeaTown venture:

“We established SeaTown Holdings, a wholly-owned global investment company, with committed capital of over S$4 billion. SeaTown operates and makes its investment decisions independently, with reciprocal co-investment rights between Temasek and SeaTown. SeaTown is intended as a co-investment platform for sophisticated investors in the medium term.”

Temasek’s Executive Director Simon Israel also discussed the new entity at a press conference. Apparently, the idea was to create an entity that invests both public money (i.e. Temasek’s money) and, eventually, private sector money:

“SeaTown is a test bed, if you will, to explore how this can be done in a sensible and sustainable manner.”

In short, the plan is to invite private institutional investors to co-invest in SeaTown in roughly 3-5 years’ time, with retail investment potentially available in a decade or so.

All in all, I think this is a pretty fascinating development, but it still begs a fundamental question: Why did Temasek go to the trouble of setting up an external institutional investor to invest in stocks and bonds when most people (at least in the West) probably think that this is exactly what Temasek is already doing?

I see a variety of possibilities, of which I’ll address just one: Temasek may be trying to dodge the SWF stigma. As Jan Randolph of IHS Global Insight argued today:

“In some ways [Temasek] wants to dilute its sovereign wealth fund-type genetic identity by managing private funds.”

In other words, if you are predisposed to think that Temasek is scary just because it’s a SWF, then the hope may be that you won’t be afraid of SeaTown — the independent, private and commercial ‘SHF’ that manages public and private money. In this manner, Temasek may want to have their investment strategies “blessed” by private and commercial investors to ensure that international and domestic audiences grant them legitimacy. It’s an interesting strategy.

GIC Frets (Needlessly) Over Liquidity Risks

Ashby Monk

Gillian Tett’s article in the FT today on the changing perceptions of liquidity risk among SWFs has me captivated; I’ve already caught myself, deep in thought, staring out various windows at least five times. What’s got my thoughts so provoked? Well, Tett appears to be privy to an internal process of evaluation taking place within the Government Investment Corporation of Singapore that could see some dramatic changes to the way it manages its money. Specifically, she portends a shift from external (co-mingled) management of assets to in-house management.

The article’s peg is the realization within GIC that the “Yale Model” isn’t a panacea for long-term investors. This is sensible enough. However, it seems to me that the GIC’s concern is more nuanced than this; the fund is less worried about widespread diversification of assets (which is espoused by Yale Modelers) than it is about some (recently unearthed) liquidity risks embedded in their supposedly “long-term” investments. As Tett notes,

“…in the past two years, sovereign funds discovered that the long-term mantra provides far less protection than previously thought. For by investing in private equity and hedge funds, the GIC (and others) ended up being exposed to the vagaries of their co-investors – and some of those had short-term horizons, or mark-to-market triggers. Thus what hurt groups such as the GIC was not just the issue of asset correlation, but a contagion of investor style as well.”

So, the GIC’s problem is apparently not with highly diversified, long-term investments—it, instead, has a problem with the investment vehicles through which it undertakes these investments; namely private equity and hedge funds.

Tett seems to imply that the GIC was forced into some “asset fire sales or unseemly investment exits” due to the “mark-to-market triggers” of its co-investors (i.e. the other limited partners) in the private equity or hedge funds. This, Tett suggests, has some within the GIC hot and bothered, as they now recognize they are taking on the liquidity risks of their fellow LPs!

I’ll be honest. I’m confused by this whole thing. As a former employee of a private equity fund (…yes, I was once seduced by the power of the dark side of the Force…), I was under the impression that limited partnerships had explicit lock-up periods that, in effect, precluded any “co-investors” (i.e. LPs) from bailing out. This is crucial for seeing any investments through to a profitable exit! In fact, I thought LPs usually had  no right to demand that sales be made at all! So, I have to say it, the whole premise of the GIC’s internal deliberations strikes me as being somewhat off …

Nonetheless, it’s been a while since I’ve seen the inside of an LP contract. So I acknowledge that the rules of the game may have changed. Indeed, when talking about hedge funds and private equity, Tett keeps using the term “co-investor” instead of “limited partner”, so maybe GIC had signed itself up to some other types of private equity or hedge fund investments? In any case, let’s play along with this for a moment. Tett then asks:

“That raises some big questions about how the GIC (and others) should conduct themselves. Should they only co-invest with similar investors in the future? Could they now demand detailed lists of their co-investors (even if they hate providing such data themselves)? Could they ask to be paid for assuming illiquidity risk? Or should they dump external managers altogether, and bring that activity “in-house”?”

More to the point, investors need to understand the nature of the co-investment (i.e. LP) contracts they are signing; if they have explicit lock-up periods that prevent the type of “stop loss” or “trigger” sales that Tett refers to, then this shouldn’t really be a problem at all. However, in cases where a co-investment has no lock-up period, then you better understand your co-investors’ liquidity constraints. Otherwise, their problems will become your problems.

In short, I think the GIC is fretting needlessly over the liquidity risks associated with PE or HF investments. This should simply be addressed as part of the due diligence process associated with the original investment in the fund. In fact, when it comes to these type of investments, one of the major concerns among investors is not being able to get at their money if they really need it…the GIC appears to be worried about just the opposite outcome.

Whole lotta shaking going on…

Ashby Monk

The entire planet is apparently shaking. The FT reported yesterday that the US financial system is about to suffer a shake up. The Washington Post notes the big shake up in Japan after Sunday’s national election. Shake ups are even happening today in Korea and Nigeria. Even the shaky are being “shaken up.” Apparently, the shaking has also hit some of the biggest SWFs in the world: the WSJ reports today that Norway’s SWF is being shaken up, and the FT reports that Singapore’s GIC is being shaken up. What’s going on?

My guess is that the economic volatility over the past few years has led to some profound changes to the global economic architecture, which the media has all agreed to refer to as a “shake up.” (I’m just a humble blogger without any real journalism credentials, but I think the term “shake up” needs its own shake up — see Tom Ricks’ article Bring the Pane for an interesting take on a similar phenomenon.) In the aftermath of the crisis, we are going to see economies and actors change, restructure, augment, alter, replace, amend, streamline and reshuffle institutional structures and governance practices.

With respect to the SWFs, the crisis has offered these funds an opportunity to examine internal practices and make appropriate changes. This has already happened in Alaska, China, Korea, Qatar, Temasek and many more. In the end, these changes will hopefully result in SWFs stopping bad practices and implementing good practices. Conceptually, I think it’s interesting to think that market forces are driving these government institutions to think about how to streamline and improve operations; a sort of internal creative destruction for public sector actors. In this case, however, the Schumpeterian entrepreneurs are injected into the SWFs (as just happened in Norway and Singapore) rather than challenging them from the outside…


About

This website is a project of Professor Gordon L. Clark and Dr. Ashby Monk of the School of Geography and the Environment at the University of Oxford. Their research on sovereign wealth funds is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and The Rotman International Centre for Pension Management.

RSS Feed

 RSS

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 327 other followers

Latest SWF News

Visitors Since August 2010


Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 327 other followers